The court emphasized the maintainability of the writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned certificate if the eligibility is prima facie unmet and uncontroverted, and the need for fair and transparent decision-making processes.

1. This appeal is preferred against the order, dated 21.10.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.106417/2016.

2. The facts of the case in brief are that the respondent No.6 was elected as a member of Zilla Panchayat from 13-Badanahatti Constituency, which was reserved for General (Woman) category in the election held on 20.2.2016. The respondent No.1 issued the notification, dated 15.4.2016 reserving the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary for Backward Class–B(Woman). The respondent No.6 contested for the said Office and was also declared as elected. It is the case of the appellants that she does not belong to Backward Class ‘B’. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the short ground of maintainability in view of the express bar contained in clause (b) of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge’s order refers to Rule 7 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Election of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat) Rules, 1994 providing for the filing of an election petition before the jurisdictional District Judge by an aggrieved party.

3. Sri M. Dhyan Chinnappa, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Rajashekar Bhurji for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition without even the contesting respondent denying the allegation that the Backward Class ‘B’ certificate is obtained fraudulently. He submits that the respondent No.6 herself has stated in her affidavit, dated 6.2.2016 (Annexure-E) that she is an income tax assessee; she has even furnished the PAN number therein. She suppresses the filing of her income tax returns in the subsequent affidavit (Annexure-F) filed on 26.4.2016 before the fifth respondent Tahsildar in support of her application for Backward Class ‘B’ certificate.

4. Sri Dhyan Chinnappa submits that for claiming backward class–B, the applicant and his/her parents/guardians should not be an income tax assessee/wealth tax assessees as per the notification, dated 13.1.1995. He submits that as per the said Government Order and in the light of the contents of her affidavit, dated 6.2.2016, it cannot be disputed that she is an income tax assessee. Therefore the issuance of Backward Class – B certificate is per se illegal.

5. He submits that this Court can exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and declare that the election of the sixth respondent is illegal, as she does not meet the basic, prescribed eligibility criteria for obtaining the caste-cum-income certificate in question. In view of the respondent No.6 furnishing the material particulars regarding her income status, there is no necessity of any further proof or evidence. In support of his submission, he read out paragraph No.26 from the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of K.VENKATACHALAM v. A.SWAMICKAN AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1999 SC 1723. The same is extracted hereinbelow:-

“26. The question that arises for consideration is if in such circumstances High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution declaring that the appellant is not qualified to be member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from Lalgudi Assembly Constituency. On the finding recorded by the High Court it is clear that the appellant in his nomination form impersonated a person known as Venkatachalam s/o Pethu, taking advantage of the fact that such person bears his first name. Appellant would be even criminally liable as he filed his nomination on affidavit impersonating himself. If in such circumstances he is allowed to continue to sit and vote in the Assembly his action would be fraud to the Constitution.”

6. He relies on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of B.R.KAPUR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANOTHER reported in (2001) 7 SCC 231 wherein it is held that the authority of the appointee to hold the appointment can be challenged in quo warranto proceedings. He brings to our notice t