2007(1) Supreme 137
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y.K. Sabharwal, CJI., Ashok Bhan, Arijit Pasayat, B.P. Singh, S.H. Kapadia, C.K. Thakker, P.K. Balasubramanyan, Altamas Kabir and D.K. Jain, JJ.
I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs.—Appellant
versus
State of Tamil Nadu—Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 1344-45 of 1976
With
WP (C) Nos. 242 of 1988, 751 of 1990, CA Nos. 6045 and 6046 of 2002, WP (C) No. 408/03, SLP (C) Nos. 14182, 14245, 14248, 14249, 26879, 14946, 14947, 26880, 26881, 14949, 26882, 14950, 26883, 14965, 26884, 14993, 15020, 26885, 15022, 15029, 14940 and 26886 of 2004, WP (C) Nos. 454, 473 and 259 of 1994, WP (C) No. 238 of 1995 & WP (C) No. 35 of 1996
All Decided on 11-1-2007
Held : While laws may be added to the Ninth Schedule, once Article 32 is triggered, these legislations must answer to the complete test of fundamental rights. Every insertion into the Ninth Schedule does not restrict Part III review, it completely excludes Part III at will. For this reason, every addition to the Ninth Schedule triggers Article 32 as part of the basic structure and is consequently subject to the review of the fundamental rights as they stand in Part III.(Para 114)
The question before us is not about power to amend Part III after 24th April, 1973. As per Kesavananda Bharati, power to amend exists in the Parliament but it is subject to the limitation of doctrine of basic structure. The fact of validation of laws based on exercise of blanket immunity eliminates Part III in entirety hence the rights test as part of the basic structure doctrine has to apply. In Kesavananda Bharatis case, the majority held that the power of amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 did not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. Kesavananda Bharatis case laid down a principle as an axiom which was examined and worked out in Indira Gandhis case, Minerva Mills, Waman Rao and Bhim Singh.(Para 116)
Judicial Review is an essential feature of the Constitution. It gives practical content to the objectives of the Constitution embodied in Part III and other parts of the Constitution. It may be noted that the mere fact that equality which is a part of the basic structure can be excluded for a limited purpose, to protect certain kinds of laws, does not prevent it from being part of the basic structure. Therefore, it follows that in considering whether any particular feature of the Constitution is part of the basic structure – rule of law, separation of power – the fact that limited exceptions are made for limited purposes, to protect certain kind of laws, does not mean that it is not part of the basic structure.(Para 125)
Every amendment to the Constitution whether it be in the form of amendment of any Article or amendment by insertion of an Act in the Ninth Schedule has to be tested by reference to the doctrine of basic structure which includes reference to Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 15 etc. As stated, laws included in the Ninth Schedule do not become part of the Constitution, they derive their validity on account of the exercise undertaken by the Parliament to include them in the Ninth Schedule. That exercise has to be tested every time it is undertaken. In respect of that exercise the principle of compatibility will come in. One has to see the effect of the impugned law on one hand and the exclusion of Part III in its entirety at the will of the Parliament.(Para 128)
The doctrine of basic structure contemplates that there are certain parts or aspects of the Constitution including Article 15, Article 21 read with Article 14 and 19 which constitute the core values which if allowed to be abrogated would change completely the nature of the Constitution. Exclusion of fundamental rights would result in nullification of the basic structure doctrine, the object of which is to protect basic features of the Constitution as indicated by the synoptic view of the rights in Part III.(Para 136)
The doctrine of basic structure as a principle has now become an axiom. It is premised on the basis that invasion of certain freedoms needs to be justified. It is the invasion which attracts the basic structure doctrine. Certain freedoms may justifiably be interfered with. If freedom, for example, is interfered in cases relating to terrorism, it does not follow that the same test can be applied to all the offences. The point to be noted is that the application of a standard is an important exercise required to be undertaken by the Court in applying the basic structure doctrine and that has to be done by the Courts and not by prescribed authority under Article 368. The existence of the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution at will, with requisite voting strength, so as to make any kind of laws that excludes Part III including power of judicial review under Article 32 is incompatible with the basic structure doctrine. Therefore, such an exercise if challenged, has to be tested on the touchstone of basic structure as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19, Article 15 and the principles thereunder.(Para 142)
In conclusion, we hold that :
(i)A law that abrogates or abridges rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution may violate the basic structure doctrine or it may not. If former is the consequence of law, whether by amendment of any Article of Part III or by an insertion in the Ninth Schedule, such law will have to be invalidated in exercise of judicial review power of the Court. The validity or invalidity would be tested on the principles laid down in this judgment.
(ii)The majority judgment in Kesavananda Bharatis case read with Indira Gandhis case, requires the validity of each new constitutional amendment to be judged on its own merits. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account for determining whether or not it destroys basic structure. The impact test would determine the validity of the challenge.
(iii)All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles underlying them. To put it differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure.
(iv)Justification for conferring protection, not blanket protection, on the laws included in the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional Amendments shall be a matter of Constitutional adjudication by examining the nature and extent of infraction of a Fundamental Right by a statute, sought to be Constitutionally protected, and on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19 by application of the "rights test" and the "essence of the right" test taking the synoptic view of the Articles in Part III as held in Indira Gandhis case. Applying the above tests to the Ninth Schedule laws, if the infraction affects the basic structure then such a law(s) will not get the protection of the Ninth Schedule.
This is our answer to the question referred to us vide Order dated 14th September, 1999 in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1999) 7 SCC 580].
(v)If the validity of any Ninth Schedule law has already been upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on the principles declared by this judgment. However, if a law held to be violative of any rights in Part III is subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April, 1973, such a violation/infraction shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Article14, Article 19 and the principles underlying thereunder.
(vi)Action taken and transactions finalized as a result of the impugned Acts shall not be open to challenge.(Para 146)
(ii) Constitution of India—Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 32—Fundamental Rights—Basic structure doctrine—Existence of power of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to make any kind of laws that excludes Part III including power of judicial review is incompatible with the basic structure doctrine—Such an exercise if challenged, has to be tested on the touchstone of basic structure as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and 19, Article 15 and the principles thereunder.
Held : It has to be borne in view that the fact that some Articles in Part III stand alone has been recognized even by the Parliament, for example, Articles 20 and 21. Article 359 provides for suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III during emergencies. However, by Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, it has been provided that even during emergencies, the enforcement of the rights under Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended. This is the recognition given by the Parliament to the protections granted under Articles 20 and 21. No discussion or argument is needed for the conclusion that these rights are part of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution and, thus, immunity by suspending those rights by placing any law in the Ninth Schedule would not be countenanced. It would be an implied limitation on the constituent power of amendment under Article 368. Same would be the position in respect of the rights under Article 32, again, a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.(Para 141)
(iii) Constitution of India—Articles 368, 31B, Ninth Schedule—Amending Power—Scope of—Limitations of doctrine of basic structure—Scope of judicial review.
Held : The constitutional amendments are subject to limitations and if the question of limitation is to be decided by the Parliament itself which enacts the impugned amendments and gives that law a complete immunity, it would disturb the checks and balances in the Constitution. The authority to enact law and decide the legality of the limitations cannot vest in one organ. The validity to the limitation on the rights in Part III can only be examined by another independent organ, namely, the judiciary. The power to grant absolute immunity at will is not compatible with basic structure doctrine and, therefore, after 24th April, 1973 the laws included in the Ninth Schedule would not have absolute immunity. Thus, validity of such laws can be challenged on the touchstone of basic structure such as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19, Article 15 and the principles underlying these Articles.(Paras 139 and 140)
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
The protection conferred by Article 31-B to laws added to the Ninth Schedule after a specific date is not absolute and must be tested against the basic or essential features of the Constitution, particularly those reflected in Articles 21, 14, 19, and their underlying principles (!) (!) .
Amendments to the Constitution that include laws in the Ninth Schedule after the specified date are subject to judicial review if they infringe on fundamental rights or damage the basic structure of the Constitution. Such laws can be challenged on the grounds of violation of Part III rights if they impact the core values of the Constitution (!) (!) (!) .
The doctrine of basic structure limits the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution. While the power to amend exists, it is constrained by the need to preserve the fundamental features, including fundamental rights, rule of law, separation of powers, and equality (!) (!) (!) .
Laws included in the Ninth Schedule after the specified date do not enjoy blanket immunity from judicial review. Their validity depends on whether they uphold or violate the basic structure, especially fundamental rights. Every such law must be individually examined for its impact on the Constitution's core principles (!) (!) .
The inclusion of laws in the Ninth Schedule, especially post the critical date, does not remove the Court’s jurisdiction to review their constitutionality. The laws can be scrutinized for their effects on fundamental rights and the basic structure, and laws that damage or destroy these core features are liable to be invalidated (!) (!) .
The power to amend the Constitution is not unlimited. It is derived within the constraints of the basic structure doctrine. The amendments must not alter the fundamental identity of the Constitution or infringe upon its core principles, including fundamental rights and separation of powers (!) (!) .
The process of judicial review remains an essential safeguard to ensure that laws, whether in the form of amendments or laws placed in the Ninth Schedule, do not violate the essential features of the Constitution. The Court must evaluate the impact of such laws on the fundamental rights and the basic structure (!) (!) .
The validity of laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after the specified date can be challenged if they infringe on the core principles of the Constitution, especially if they damage the fundamental rights or alter the basic structure. Laws previously upheld are not immune from future challenge if their impact changes or violates these core principles (!) .
The Court emphasizes the importance of a synoptic view of the Constitution, considering the interconnectedness of fundamental rights, rule of law, separation of powers, and equality, when evaluating the validity of amendments or laws in the Ninth Schedule (!) (!) (!) .
The Court recognizes that the doctrine of basic structure is an axiom that limits the scope of the Parliament’s amending power. Any exercise of this power that results in the destruction of the core features of the Constitution is unconstitutional and invalid (!) (!) .
The Court's role is to uphold the constitutional scheme by ensuring that laws or amendments do not infringe upon or damage the basic features, especially fundamental rights, judicial review, and separation of powers. This includes scrutinizing laws in the Ninth Schedule for their impact on these core principles (!) (!) (!) .
In conclusion, the Court holds that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after the critical date are subject to the same rigorous standards of constitutional scrutiny as other laws, particularly with regard to their impact on the basic structure and fundamental rights. Any law found to violate these core principles can be declared invalid, maintaining the integrity of the Constitution's foundational values (!) (!) .
These points collectively highlight that the immunity traditionally associated with laws in the Ninth Schedule is limited by the fundamental principles of the Constitution, and judicial review remains a vital mechanism to protect its core features.
JUDGMENT
Y.K. Sabharwal, CJI.—In these matters we are confronted with a very important yet not very easy task of determining the nature and character of protection provided by Article 31-B of the Constitution of India, 1950 (for short, the Constitution) to the laws added to the Ninth Schedule by amendments made after 24th April, 1973. The relevance of this date is for the reason that on this date judgment in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati, Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr. [(1973) 4 SCC 225] was pronounced propounding the doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution to test the validity of constitutional amendments.
Re : Order of Reference
2. The order of reference made more than seven years ago by a Constitution Bench of Five Judges is reported in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1999) 7 SCC 580] (14.9.1999). The Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 (the Janmam Act), insofar as it vested forest lands in the Janmam estates in the State of Tamil Nadu, was struck down by this Court in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1972) 2 SCC 133] because this was not found to be a measure of agrarian reform protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. Section 2(c) of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979 was struck down by the Calcutta High Court as being arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional and the special leave petition filed against the judgment by the State of West Bengal was dismissed. By the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, the Janmam Act, in its entirety, was inserted in the Ninth Schedule. By the Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979, in its entirety, was inserted in the Ninth Schedule. These insertions were the subject matter of challenge before a Five Judge Bench.
3. The contention urged before the Constitution Bench was that the statutes, inclusive of the portions thereof which had been struck down, could not have been validly inserted in the Ninth Schedule.
4. In the referral order, the Constitution Bench observed that, according to Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1981) 2 SCC 362], amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule was amended from time to time by inclusion of various Acts, regulations therein were open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. The decision in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1980) 3 SCC 625)], Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors. [(1981) 1 SCC 166] were also noted and it was observed that the judgment in Waman Rao needs to be reconsidered by a larger Bench so that the apparent inconsistencies therein are reconciled and it is made clear whether an Act or regulation which, or a part of which, is or has been found by this Court to be violative of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 can be included in the Ninth Schedule or whether it is only a constitutional amendment amending the Ninth Schedule which damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution that can be struck down. While referring these matters for decision to a larger Bench, it was observed that preferably the matters be placed before a Bench of nine Judges. This is how these matters have been placed before us.
Broad Question
5. The fundamental question is whether on and after 24th April, 1973 when basic structures doctrine was propounded, it is permissible for the Parliament under Article 31B to immunize legislations from fundamental rights by inserting them into the Ninth Schedule and, if so, what is its effect on the power of judicial review of the Court.
Development of the Law
6. First, we may consider, in brief, the factual background of framing of the Constitution
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati, Sripadagalvara v. State of Kerala & Anr.
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain
Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla
M. Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors.
S.R. Bommai & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
M. Nagaraj & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Ors.
Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India
State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Man Singh Suraj Singh Padvi & Ors.
Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India & Ors.
Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
Attorney General for India & Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas & Ors.
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. The Union of India
Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Haradhan Saha & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India & State of Bihar
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan
I.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.
Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors.
The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji & Anr.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.
I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil Nadu
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