Since common issues are involved in these matters, the same are clubbed together and disposed of by this common order. The petitioners in these batch of matters have challenged the amendment to Section 72(1), 72(3) and the insertion of sub-section 4 in Section 72 of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966 (‘the Act’ for short) and the insertion of Rule 76-A of the Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Rules, 1968 (‘the Rules’ for short) vide notification dated 17.2.2014 and the consequential notices issued thereof.

2. The petitioners, the holders of composite licence issued by 2nd respondent under Rule 76(4) of the Rules to carry on business as Trader, Commission Agent, Exporter, Importer and stockist, are before this Court challenging the amendments aforesaid as ultra-vires the Constitution of India.

3. The learned senior counsel Sri S. Sreevatsa representing Sri Vishwakarmaraj Nayak for the petitioners contended that the petitioners being the holder of a valid licence as ‘trader’ valid upto 2018-19, by the present amendment is completely erased from existence in Section 72 (1) and 72(3) without their licence having been terminated in a manner known to law.

4. The Amendment carried to Section 72 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act omitting the term “Trader” would affect the licencees in as much as grant or renewal of the licences by the Market Committee for the use of any place in the market area for the sale of the notified agricultural produce.

5. Insertion of sub-section (4) to Section 72 of the Act mandates the existing licencee to obtain a fresh trader licence within a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Amended Act, 2013. The said amendments are ultra-vires the constitutional guarantees and ex-facie discriminatory and imposing unreasonable restrictions upon the petitioners’ rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

6. It was vehemently argued that exercise of the powers under Section 72(4) in establishing Respondent No.3 as the Direct Purchase Center gives monopoly in favour of a private party, which does not have the protection of Article 19(6)(ii). The law cannot be used by the State for the benefit of a private person/body and in any arrangement in which under the guise of a monopoly, the State is permitted to enable a private party to make profit for themselves by carrying on business to the total exclusion of others is violative of Fundamental Rights.

7. The State has sought to canalise and create a monopoly with respect to trading in agricultural produce in favour of NSPOT, a private party, who are not the agents of the Government but are also authorised to carry on trade on their own account. Even in exercise of contractual powers of the State, the principles of Article 14 have to be followed to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism, which is conspicuously absent in the present case.

8. It was further argued that the accrued and vested rights of the petitioners’ licencees cannot be taken away by way of an Amendment contrary to the provisions of the Act and Rules. It was contended that the petitioners’ licencees who had been given licences for trading, had a legitimate expectation that the proprietary rights that had already enured in their favour would continue, the sudden deprivation of a long term subsisting licence without any statutory provision for cancellation of the same under Section 72(4) of the Act goes to the very root of the propriety and constitutionality of the Amendment.

9. By the present omissions and insertions in Section 72 of the Act by way of an Amendment, the contract between the petitioners and the Respondent No.2 is sought to be re-written, which is illegal and ultra-vires the Act. It was argued that the Amendment to Rule 76-A compels persons like petitioner to virtually surrender their existing trader licence and obtain a fresh licence following due procedure prescribed therein. The imposition of the sai