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2018 Supreme(Kar) 779

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR, J.
Sri. Irshad Baig S/o Late Mehaboob Baig – Appellant
Versus
Smt. Chowramma W/o Late Shastri Inneshappa – Respondent
Regular First Appeal No. 34 of 2015
Decided On : 28-11-2018

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Sri. R. Abhinav for Sri. S. Subhash.
For the Respondent: Sri. P.B. Ajit.

Headnote:

Civil Procedure Code,1908 – Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) - Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act – Section 10 – Property - Sale deed - Permanent Injunction to restrain - Appellant’s suit is for reliefs, to declare that sale deed executed by defendant in favour of defendant is not binding on plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property - Permanent Injunction to restrain defendants or anybody claiming through them from alienating or encumbering or creating third party charge on suit schedule property - Plaintiff has pleaded that he is the absolute owner of suit schedule property having purchased same from defendant for valuable consideration - Defendant executed an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff by receiving sale consideration amount and on the same day, they also executed Power of Attorney in his favour – Held, in light of these principles, if plaint in O.S. is read, what becomes clear is that plaintiff has not yet become owner of the property - He claims to be in possession of suit property only on basis of the agreement of sale and a registered Power of Attorney - Defendant No. 7 purchased property through registered sale deed - But granting an order of temporary injunction prohibiting alienation pending disposal of suit can be said to be an exception as such an order is required some times to avoid multiplicity of proceedings - Therefore given a meaningful reading to plaint, plaintiff gets no right to claim the reliefs that he has sought for in the plaint - Holding of trial is a futile exercise - Looked from this angle it can very well be said that the plaint does not disclose cause of action; suit is not maintainable even if limitation point is ignored - Hence, court come to conclusion that impugned order does not suffer from infirmity - Appeal is dismissed - However, this order will not come in the way of plaintiff seeking appropriate relief, which is available under law – Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard the appellant’s counsel and learned counsel for respondent No. 8 at the time of admission.

2. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 27217/2011 on the file of the XXVIII Additional City Civil Judge, Mayo Hall, Bengaluru, has preferred this appeal aggrieved by the order dated 22.09.2014 passed on application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) by respondent No. 8.

3. The appellant’s suit is for the following reliefs:

“(a) To declare that the sale deed dated 01.03.2008 executed by defendant Nos. 1 to 6 in favour of defendant No. 7 is not binding on the plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property.

(b) Permanent Injunction to restrain the defendants or anybody claiming through them from alienating or encumbering or creating third party charge on the suit schedule property situated in Survey No. 18, Yelenahalli village, Chandrashekarapura, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru.”

4. The plaintiff has pleaded that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property having purchased the same from defendant Nos.1 to 6 for valuable consideration. On 08.12.1993, defendant Nos.1 to 6 executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff by receiving the sale consideration amount of Rs. 3,24,000/- and on the same day, they also executed Power of Attorney in his favour. According to the plaintiff, the Power of Attorney executed by defendant Nos. 1 to 6 was irrevocable as it was coupled with interest. The plaintiff paid entire consideration amount and he was put in possession of suit schedule property also. The sale deed could not be registered because of the restrictions imposed by the State Government. This being the state of affairs, the plaintiff was shocked and surprised when the defendants along with their henchmen came near the suit property, threatened and asked them to immediately vacate the suit property. On enquiry, the plaintiff came to know that defendant Nos. 1 to 6 had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of one Thaniga Malai, who in turn executed the General Power of Attorney in favour of Krishnamurthy i.e. defendant No. 7 on 14.03.2008 in respect of 06 acres 29 guntas of land in the said survey number. The plaintiff stated that since he had purchased the suit property from defendant Nos. 1 to 6, defendant No. 7 would not get any title and therefore, the sale deed dated 14.03.2008 should be declared as not binding on him.

5. During the pendency of the suit, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) was filed by defendant No. 8, contending that the plaint would not disclose cause of action, that the suit was hit under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and that the suit was time barred. The trial Court allowed this application and rejected the plaint.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that limitation is mixed question of law and facts. In the plaint, it is clearly stated that the cause of action arose in the first week of August, 2011 when the plaintiff learnt about the attempt made by defendant No. 7 to get the mutation to his name and on specific other dates. He argues that so far as declaratory relief is concerned, the date of knowledge is important. Though the sale deed was executed on 14.03.2008, it was in the first week of August, 2011 that the plaintiff came to know about the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No. 7 and therefore, from the date of knowledge, the suit was within time. Defendant can always rebut the evidence that the plaintiff adduces with regard to date of knowledge and demonstrate that the plaintiff has wrongly pleaded about cause of action. This exercise should be made only after recording of evidence and not at the threshold. He further argues that the plaintiff was put in possession pursuant to agreement, and to protect his possession, he could seek relief of permanent injunction. In the plaint, it is clearly averred about the interference made by the defendants and therefore, with regard to relief of permanent injunction, the plaint s








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