JUDGMENT :

Sreenivas Harish Kumar, J.

These two petitions are disposed of by a common order as they arise from the common order passed by the Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Court Hall No. 58, Bengaluru, on the applications I.A2 and 3 filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) (c) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure in O.S.25299/2017. CRP 157/2019 is filed by defendants no.1, 2 and 3 and CRP 168/2019 is filed by defendant no.5. If defendants 1 to 3 sought rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a)(c) and (d), the fifth defendant sought rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a). Since the trial court dismissed these applications, these revision petitions are filed.

2. I have heard arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the trial court has come to an erroneous conclusion that trial requires to be held in view of the material facts pleaded by the plaintiffs in the suit. Even with regard to limitation, a wrong finding has been given that it is also a mixed question of law and fact. The suit is for declaration that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of their undivided 1/3rd share in the schedule property, to declare that the registered sale deeds dated 18.3.2005, 29.3.2007 and 15.6.2016 are void ab initio and do not bind the plaintiffs' interest and for possession of their 1/3rd share. In para 38 of the plaint, the cause of action is shown to have arisen first on 18.3.2005. The suit was filed in the year 2017. Without declaring the sale deeds as null and void, the plaintiffs will not be entitled to 1/3rd share. Therefore, the suit should have been filed within three years from 18.3.2005. Prima facie the suit appears to be time barred. The trial court should have rejected the plaint. He argued that even going by the plaint averments, it can very well be said that the plaintiffs were very much aware of all the transactions that took place when their father was alive. They have suppressed the material fact of execution of an agreement of sale and an affidavit in favour of first and second defendants. They should have disclosed these transactions. They did not challenge all those transactions for a quite long time. They were parties to some of the documents. Therefore, they do not get a right to sue for the reliefs that they have claimed in the plaint. In this view, the trial court should have come to conclusion that the plaint does not disclose cause of action. He argued for allowing the revision petitions and rejecting the plaint.

3. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents argued that the plaintiffs' father, E.Shankarappa Reddy along with his brothers might have executed power of attorney in favour of defendants 1 and 2. But all three brothers jointly purchased the property. Shankarappa Reddy had 1/3rd share. He died on 21.4.2003. After his death, the power of attorney could not be enforced by the defendants 1 and 2 in so far as 1/3rd share of Shankarappa Reddy was concerned. Moreover defendant No.1 alone executed the sale deed though the power of attorney was executed jointly in favour of defendants 1 and 2. The subsequent sale deeds are void ab initio. The plaintiffs succeeded to 1/3rd share of their father. When the sale deed was bad in law, their right and title remains in tact. The plaintiffs had to join with their father at the time of executing the power of attorney as the defendants 1 and 2 insisted that the plaintiffs should also execute power of attorney along with their father. In view of the pleadings put forth by the plaintiffs, a thorough trial requires to be held. Just because the plaintiffs have sought declaration of their title, it cannot be said that the suit is time barred and that the plaint does not disclose cause of action. The trial court has come to right conclusion.

4. In the light of the above arguments, given a plain reading to the plaint, what is forthcoming is that on 23.1.2002, E. Shankarappa Reddy