Point of law: Quash of FIR - Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the section itself. The High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice.

ORDER :

1. The petitioner arraigned as accused in C.C. No. 138 of 2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 176, 177, 181, 199 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which is pending before the Court of Senior City Civil and JMFC, Soraba Taluk, Shivamogga District, is before this Court seeking to quash the order dated 26.05.2017 passed by the Court below taking cognizance of the offences pursuant to the charge-sheet filed in C.C. No. 138 of 2017 by urging various grounds.

2. Heard Shri S. Kalyan Basavaraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, so also, Smt. Rashmi Jadhav, learned HCGP appearing for the first respondent/State and Shri Prakash M. Patil, learned counsel for the second respondent who are physically present before the Court. But counsel for the second respondent can only assist the learned HCGP appearing for the first respondent/State as under Section 301 of Cr.P.C. but cannot independently address his arguments.

3. It is transpired from the materials available on record that a private complaint has been lodged by the second respondent/complainant against the accused in P.C.R. No. 81 of 2015 for the offences, which reflected therein. On filing of a private complaint, the Court of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Soraba pursuant to the charge-sheet filed in C.C. No. 138 of 2017 took cognizance against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 176, 177, 181, 199 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 vide its order dated 26.05.2017. The case has been referred as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. to the jurisdictional police having domain to investigate the case and submit the report.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me to the initiation of the private complaint by the second respondent against the accused. He submits that the alleged offences in respect of which cognizance was taken by the Trial Court vide its order dated 26.05.2017 is erroneous and without any authority of law and also do not have any domain to proceed with the case so as to refer the matter as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation and submit the report. On that ground alone, it requires intervention of this Court by exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

5. The primary ground as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is relating to taking cognizance of the offences on the basis of a final report submitted by the first respondent/Police. Further, he contended that the Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the offences based on the final report in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 176, 177, 181, 199 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on the basis of the complaint made by the second respondent under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. pursuant to which referring the same under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and thereafter taking cognizance after filing of the final report in the light of express bar contemplated under Section 195 of Cr.P.C.

6. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the case of Sachida Nand Singh and Another vs. State of Bihar and Another, 1998 (2) SCC 493 whereas in the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had addressed the issues relating to the concept of Section 190 of Cr.P.C. wherein it is held that:

“7.........Section 190 of the Code empowers “any magistrate of the first class” to take cognizance of “any offence” upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the Magistrate and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtailed. It is a well recognized canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise [Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718].”

7. Lastly the counsel for the petitioner submits that it is the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High C