The main legal point established in the judgment is that time can be considered the essence of a contract based on the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the agreement, pleadings, and evidence. Additionally, the judgment clarified the criteria for a bonafide purchaser for value without notice and discussed the validity of the agreement dtd. 15/9/1995 under Sec. 4 of the PTCL Act.

JUDGMENT/ORDER

1. In RSA No.642/2009 and RSA No.641/2009, the appellant is questioning the divergent findings in RA Nos.22/2009 and 26/2009 respectively on the file of the Principal District Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru. In terms of the impugned judgment and decree dtd. 17/2/2009 by allowing the appeal filed by defendants No.1 and 2, the suit for the specific performance of the contract is dismissed.

2. The suit in O.S. No.5/2005 was filed by the present appellant for the relief of specific performance of the contract dtd. 4/10/2004. Though there is no specific reference to the date of the agreement in the prayer, from the pleading it is apparent that the suit is filed to enforce the contract dtd. 4/10/2004 executed by the 1st defendant.

3. The subject matter of the suit is an agricultural land bearing Sy. No.250 measuring 4 acres situated at Kadanoor Village, Doddaballapur Taluk. The plaintiff has sought relief against the first defendant who executed the agreement for sale agreeing to sell the property at a price of Rs.1, 80, 000.00 per acre. Plaintiff claims to have paid Rs.2, 00, 000.00 as advance. Plaintiff was supposed to pay Rs.5, 20, 000.00. The second defendant is arrayed as he had purchased the suit schedule property from the plaintiff under the registered sale deed dtd. 6/12/2004 which is registered on 8/12/2004. Admittedly, the defendant had purchased the property before the suit.

4. The suit was contested by both the defendants i.e., the first defendant - vendor and the second defendant - subsequent purchaser. The first defendant has admitted the execution of the agreement for sale dtd. 4/10/2004, however, it is his stand that the time was the essence of the contract. The contract was required to be performed within two months from the date of execution of the agreement and same being not performed he sold the property to the second defendant and has prayed for the dismissal of the suit. He would further contend that he sold the property two days after the expiry of two months period and the 2nd defendant purchased the property for valuable consideration.

5. The second defendant contends that he is the bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the agreement dtd. 4/10/2004 between the plaintiff and the first defendant. It is also contended that the second defendant purchased the property being the assignee of one Chandrashekar who had entered into an agreement to purchase the suit property on 15/9/1995, from the first defendant.

6. The Trial Court has concluded that the transaction between the defendants is not valid. The Trial Court has not accepted the contention of the second defendant that the sale deed is executed in favour of the second defendant as the assignee under the prior agreement for sale dtd. 15/9/1995, between the first defendant and Chandrashekar. The trial Court has held that the alleged agreement dtd. 15/9/1995 is not proved. Consequently, the suit is decreed for the specific performance of the contract.

7. Aggrieved by the same, both the defendants independently filed the appeal. The First Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit by allowing the appeal on three grounds, namely;

(i) Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract

(ii) Second Defendant is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the agreement between the plaintiff and first defendant

(iii) Time was the essence of the contract and the plaintiff not having performed his part of the contract before the stipulated time under the agreement dtd. 4/10/2004 is not entitled to the relief of specific performance of the contract.

8. These appeals were admitted on 16/11/2010 to consider the following substantial question of law:

"Whether in the face of stipulation in the agreement for the performance of the contract within two months, it could be said that time was the essence of the contract in the light of the judgment of the Supre