2000(1) Supreme 319
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Allahabad High Court)
S.P. Bharucha, N. Santosh Hegde and Ruma Pal, JJ.
Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs. & Ors. -Appellants
versus
Achhaibar Dubey & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 4955 of 1999
Decided on 1-2-2000
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : Sudhir Chandra, Sr. Advocate and Parmanand Gaur and Ms. Priya Rao, Achintya Dvivedi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : B.D. Agarwala, Sr. Advocate, Anish Dayal, Ms. Manjula Gupta, Advocates.
Held : The obligation imposed by Section 16 is upon the Court not to grant specific performance to a plaintiff who has not met the requirements of clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. A Court may not, therefore, grant to a plaintiff who has failed to aver and to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement the specific performance whereof he seeks. There is, therefore, no question of the plea being available to one defendant and not another. It is open to any defendant to contend and establish that the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) has not been complied with and it is for the court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with and, depending upon its conclusion, decree or decline to decree the suit. (Para 5)
Key Points: - The court holds that a plaintiff must aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform to obtain specific performance; failure disqualifies relief. (!) - Any defendant may contend that the plaintiff did not meet the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c); the court must determine compliance and may grant or deny decree accordingly. (!) - The judgment remands the suit to the trial court to decide whether the original plaintiff and their legal representatives had proven readiness and willingness, and to decide the suit thereafter. (!) (!) - The plea that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform is not limited to the vendor/defendant and is available to any defendant. (!) - The decision overturns a prior judgment, noting that Jugraj Singh’s case is erroneous and requires remand for factual determination. (!) - The appeal is allowed, and the suit is remanded for expeditious decision within six months. (!)
JUDGMENT
Bharucha, J.-This appeal stands referred to a Bench of three Judges because the two learned Judges who heard it earlier found difficulty in following the judgment of a Bench of two learned Judges in Jugraj Singh & Anr. v. Labh Singh & Ors.1.
2. It is not necessary to go into any great detail insofar as the facts are concerned. The appellants before us are the legal representatives of a subsequent purchaser of certain property. They were defendants to a suit by one Bachna for specific performance of an earlier agreement to sell that property to her. She had not pleaded in her plaint that she was ready willing to perform her part of the agreement, but that plea was later introduced by way of an amendment. The question now is in regard to whether she or her legal representatives were, in fact, at all material times ready and willing to perform their part of that agreement. The first appellate Court declined to permit the present appellants to plead and contend that Bachna and her legal representatives were never prepared to perform their part of the agreement and, for this purpose, it relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Jugraj Singh. The High Court, in second appeal, affirmed that view.
3. In Jugraj Singh s case, upon substantially similar facts, this Court noted Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and the dictum of the Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sasson2 that in a suit for specific performance the averment of readiness and willingness on the plaintiff s part, upto the date of the decree, was necessary. It also noted that this Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar3 had held that it was for the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance "to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail." Jugraj Singh s case, however, held:
"That plea is specifically available to the vendor/defendant. It is personal to him. The subsequent purchasers have got only the right to defend their purchase on the premise that they have no prior knowledge of the agreement of sale with the plaintiff. They are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. Though they are necessary parties to the suit, since any decree obtained by the plaintiff would be binding on the subsequent purchasers, the plea that the plaintiff must always be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract must be available only to the vendor or his legal representatives, but not to the subsequent purchasers."
4. The decision in Jugraj Singh s case was noted by a Bench of two learned Judges in Lakhi Ram v. Trikha Ram4 and doubted, but the appeal there was decided on another point.
Section 16 of the Specific Performance Act reads:
"16. Personal bars to relief.-Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-
(a) x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant."
5. The obligation imposed by Section 16 is upon the Court not to grant specific performance to a plaintiff who has not met the requirements of clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. A Court may not, therefore, grant to a plaintiff who has failed to aver and to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement the specific performance whereof he seeks. There is, therefore, no question of the plea being available to one defendant and not another. It is open to any defendant to contend and establish that the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) has not been complied with and it is for the court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with and, dependin
The main legal point established in the judgment is the binding effect of the settlement between the parties, the waiver of the right to seek re-employment by the workmen, and the entitlement of the ....
A lockout is justified if it is declared in response to an illegal strike or a strike that is in breach of a settlement or award.
The combination of eyewitness testimonies, recovery of the weapon used, and forensic examination results can establish guilt in criminal cases, even based on circumstantial evidence.
The conviction of an accused person under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act is not permissible in law if the accused is also charged with committing murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The court can enhance compensation based on the deceased's income and family dependency, and adjust the multiplier used by the Tribunal if found unjustified.
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.