The prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and conflicting evidence, including testimonies from interested witnesses, undermines convictions.

JUDGMENT :

H.P. SANDESH, J.

Criminal Appeal No.200047/2016 is filed challenging the judgment of conviction dated 22.03.2016 and order of sentence dated 23.03.2026 passed in Sessions Case No.85/2013 by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bidar (hereinafter referred to as ‘trial Court’) for the offences punishable under Sections 447 , 435 and 504 r/w Section 34 of IPC and other Criminal Appeal No.200066/2016 is filed challenging the acquittal of accused for the offences punishable under Section 436 of the IPC.

2. The factual matrix of the case of the prosecution is that at 8:00 a.m. on 01.04.2012 when the complainant and his son Chennabasavanna went near his sugarcane land Sy.No.100/A for transportation of sugarcane to the Sugar factory, at that time they found fire was set on the sugarcane crops and having moved towards the entire area found accused Nos.1 to 3 are setting the fire for remaining area. As a result, sugarcane crop and hut which is in existence in the very same property was burnt and accused have caused loss to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/- and hence complaint is lodged and case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 447 , 435, 436 and 504 r/w Section 34 IPC.

3. It is also the case of the prosecution that having registered the case, the Investigating Officer has investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet. After filing of charge-sheet case is registered as C.C.No.1594/2012 and thereafter, case was committed to the Sessions Judge and the same is numbered as Sessions Case No.85/2013. The Trial Court had secured accused Nos.1 to 3 and they were enlarged on bail and they did not plead guilty and hence, charges are framed.

4. The prosecution examined PW-1 to PW-9 and got marked Ex.P.1 to 17 and got marked material objects as MOs.1 to 3. On closure of prosecution case, the accused persons were subjected to Section 313 of Cr.P.C statement wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances and they did not choose to give any statement and led defence evidence by examining DW-1 and DW-2 and got marked Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.11. The Trial Court having considered the material on record, both oral and documentary evidence convicted the accused persons and sentenced them and acquitted for offences under Section 436 of IPC. Hence, the present appeals are filed before this Court challenging the conviction and also acquittal for the offence under Section 436 of IPC.

5. The main contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.200047/2016 before this Court that the Trial Judge committed an error in accepting the evidence of PW.1 and PW.3 as both of them are interested witnesses. PW.3 also turned hostile in part and all the other witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and considered only the interested witnesses evidence.

6. The learned counsel also vehemently contends that none of the independent witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and Trial Court wrongly considered the evidence of PW.1 to PW.4 and further evidence of PW.5, 6, 7 and 9 even though they turned hostile and had arrived at in coming to the conclusion that appellants are found guilty and the same is not in corroboration of evidence by any of the independent witnesses and nothing is proved before the Trial Court that sugarcane crop of the complainant was burnt by accused persons and hence, it requires interference of this Court.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants also would vehemently contends that though nine witnesses have been examined, though PW-2 supports for seizure mahazar, his evidence is not helpful to the prosecution in proving that accused persons only set the fire and only he is the mahazar witness to the seizure.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants also vehemently contends that PW.4 is the photographer and he supports only that he took the photographs and given CD.

9. The learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contends that PW.5 and PW.9 who ar