1. Suit for permanent injunction against film release — Alleged infringement of personality rights, privacy and fair trial rights. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 )
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2026 Supreme(Kar) 516
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
PRADEEP SINGH YERUR, J.
Sri Darshan Srinivas S/o Late Thoogudeepa Srinivas - Appellant
Vs.
Siri Productions (Proprietorship Concern) Rep. By Its Proprietor/Producer Sri. Tanush S - Respondent
Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 4257 Of 2026 (CPC-)
Decided On : 17-07-2026
Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant :Sri.M.S.Shyam Sundar., Senior Counsel For Sri. Pratham N.,Advocate
For the Respondent:Sri.Vivek Subba Reddy Senior Counsel For Sri Dhananjay C.P., Advocate
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant :Sri.M.S.Shyam Sundar., Senior Counsel For Sri. Pratham N.,Advocate
For the Respondent:Sri.Vivek Subba Reddy Senior Counsel For Sri Dhananjay C.P., Advocate
Freedom of speech and artistic expression under Article 19(1)(a) outweighs claims of privacy or trial prejudice when a film is certified by the statutory censor board and based on public domain information, provided the lower court's discretionary order is not perverse.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 - Constitution of India - Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2) and 21 - Cinematograph Act, 1952 - Section 5B - Temporary Injunction - Freedom of speech and expression vs. Right to privacy and fair trial - Once the statutory censorship authority has evaluated a film and issued a certification, the Court should not act as a Super Censor Board over the expert body (Paras 16, 24).
(B) Right to Privacy - Information available in the public domain or based on public records ceases to be private; artistic works depicting such information do not necessarily infringe the constitutional right to privacy (Paras 17, 25).
(C) Fair Trial - Cinematic depictions of events similar to a sub-judice matter do not automatically prejudice the administration of justice, as courts are equipped to decide cases based on legal evidence and precedents rather than artistic portrayals (Para 18).
(D) Scope of Appellate Court - Interference in a discretionary order regarding temporary injunction is warranted only if the order is afflicted by perversity, illegality, or arbitrariness, and not merely because a different view is possible (Para 20).
Facts of the case:
The plaintiff, an actor and under-trial prisoner in a murder case, sought a permanent and temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from releasing a movie. The plaintiff contended that the film, which claimed to be "inspired by true events," shared numerous factual parallels with the ongoing criminal trial, thereby violating his right to privacy and his right to a fair trial. The trial court initially granted an ex-parte interim order but subsequently dismissed the application for temporary injunction.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the movie is a creation of art and imagination. Since the parallels were based on information available in the public domain, there was no infringement of the right to privacy. Furthermore, the certification by the statutory authority was valid, and the release of the film would not unduly influence the trial court dealing with the criminal matter.
Issues: Whether the trial court's order dismissing the application for temporary injunction was perverse, illegal, or arbitrary, and whether it warranted interference by the appellate court.
Ratio Decidendi: Freedom of speech and artistic expression under Article 19(1)(a) is sacrosanct and cannot be curtailed unless it violates reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). Once a statutory authority has certified a film, the court should defer to that expert opinion. The use of public domain information in a fictional work does not violate the right to privacy or jeopardize a fair trial, as judicial decisions are based on evidence and law, not cinematic depictions.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- civil procedure
- constitutional law
- cinematograph law
-
intellectual property
- personality rights
-
crime and sentencing
-
offences against the person
- murder
-
offences against the person
-
contempt of court
- sub judice interference
Table of Contents
2. Film allegedly dramatises pending criminal case — Claimed subjudice interference versus claimed creative fiction and freedom of expression. (Para 8 , 9 )
3. Court should not sit as Super Censor Board over CBFC certification. No perversity in trial court order denying temporary injunction. (Para 16 , 17 , 20 , 28 )
4. Mere similarities to subjudice criminal case do not per se justify curtailing freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). (Para 14 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 24 , 25 , 26 )
5. Appeal dismissed. Trial court order upheld. No interference with refusal of temporary injunction. (Para 29 )
6. What are the three essential ingredients for grant of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC?
Prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. (Para 12 , 21 , 22 )
7. Can a court sit as a Super Censor Board and second-guess a CBFC certification for film release?
No. Once the statutory authority grants certification, courts should not ordinarily interfere except in cases of clear law violation. (Para 16 , 20 , 26 )
8. Does a film with similarities to a subjudice criminal case automatically infringe the right to a fair trial?
No. Courts are well-equipped to decide cases on legal merits, not swayed by cinematic depictions or similarities. (Para 14 , 18 )
9. What is the scope of appellate court review of a discretionary order granting or refusing temporary injunction?
Appellate court examines perversity, arbitrariness, or capriciousness; it does not substitute its own view unless the order is perverse. (Para 20 )
10. When does the right to privacy cease to subsist regarding matters already in the public domain?
Once a matter becomes part of public records, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes legitimate subject for comment. (Para 17 , 25 )
JUDGMENT :
PRADEEP SINGH YERUR, J.
This appeal is preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the order dated 2.6.2026 passed on I.A. No.1 in O.S. No.2151/2026 by the XVII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.
2. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are on caveat, who are defendant Nos.1 and 2 before the trial Court. Since the application in question is concerned with respondent no. 1 and 2, the others are not notified.
3. Parties to the proceedings shall be referred to as per their ranking before the trial Court, for the sake of brevity.
4. Plaintiffs filed the suit against defendants for Permanent Injunction restraining the defendant Nos.1 and 2, their representatives from in any manner producing, filming, editing, promoting, marketing, releasing, distributing, exhibiting, telecasting, streaming, selling, licensing, leasing or dealing with the movie titled “BOSS”. Alongwith with the plaint, an application came to be filed by the plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC in I.A. No.1/2026 for grant of an ad-interim order of Temporary Injunction against defendant Nos.1 and 2.
5. Initially, before issuance of notice, the trial Court by an order dated 27.3.2026 passed an interim order on I.A. No.1/2026 against defendant Nos.1 and 2, Producer and Director of the movie. Based on the said order, respondents were notified and an affidavit of compliance is filed with regard to communicating the order to the defendants.
6. Before the notices were served, defendant Nos.1 and 2 moved an application for advancement by filing the written statement and adopting the same as statement of objections to the application - I.A. No.1 and sought to dispose of the application on merits. The matter was taken up and the application under Order - XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of CPC came to be dismissed by the learned trial Judge by the impugned order dated 2.6.2026. It is this order of dismissal of IA.No.1 which is called in question by the plaintiffs in this appeal.
7. I have heard learned senior counsel – Sri M.S. Shyam Sundar appearing on behalf of learned counsel – Sri Pratham .N for appellants/plaintiffs as well as learned senior counsel – Sri Vivek Subba Reddy on behalf of learned counsel – Sri Dhananjay C.P. for respondent Nos.1 and 2.
8. It is the contention of learned senior counsel - Sri M.S. Shyam Sundar appearing on behalf of learned counsel - Sri Pratham N for appellants/plaintiffs that plaintiff no. 1 is one of the most celebrated and commercially successful actor and film producer in the South Indian film industry, specifically the Kannada film industry (Sandalwood). Over a career spanning more than two decades, he has delivered a string of blockbuster Kannada films, earning fans across the State of Karnataka and beyond. It is also contended by learned senior counsel that plaintiff no. 1 is universally known, addressed and identified by his distinctive fans as “challenging star Darshan”, “BOSS”, and “D-BOSS”. The last of which has become so uniquely and exclusively identified with him that the general public, the media, the Karnataka film industry, and the Courts themselves use it interchangeably with his name. The plaintiff No.2, who is the appellant No.2 herein is the wife of appellant No.1.
8.1 It is further contended that the plaintiff No.1 has over the span of several years of hard work and dedication in the film industry identified himself to be a superstar and his fans conferred upon him the title “BOSS” as a mark of reverence and the same has been consistently used in media publications, social media, fan clubs, public discourse etc. It is further contended that this distinctive persona and trade identity is a valuable property right as recognized by Courts across India.
8.2 It is also contended that on 09.06.2024, Crime No.250/2024 was registered by the Kamakshipalya Police Station, Bengaluru against the plaintiff No.1 and others for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC, in connection with the alleged murder of one Sr
