JUDGMENT - Gajendragadkar, J.

1. This is an appeal against the order passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Baroda, directing that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the propert Court. By his plaint the plaintiff had claimed to recover Rs. 10,800 from the defendants on the ground that there was a valid contract between the parties and that the defendants had failed to perform their part of the contract. In other words, it is an action for damages for breach of contract. The defendants reside at Kanpur, outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge at Baroda, and the plaintiff conceded that the Civil Judge in whose Court he filed the plaint would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the provisions of Section 20, Sub-sections (a) and (b), of the Code of Civil Procedure.

He, however, alleged that the cause of action had accrued partly within the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge and so the suit as filed before him would be competent under Section 20 (c), Civil P. C. The defendants denied this allegation and contended that the whole of the contract had been made outside the jurisdiction of the trial Judge and so the provisions of Section 20 (c) were inapplicable to the present case.

The learned Judge has upheld this plea and in the result an order has been passed directing the return of the plaint to the plaintiff. Thus the only question which arises before us is whether the trial Court was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 20 (c). The decision of this point would depend upon the answer to the question as to whether part of the cause of action in respect of the plaintiffs claim has arisen within the local limits of the trial Court.

2. It is common ground between the parties that the contract in question was for sale of 200 tons of groundnut cakes and it had been entered into by telegrams. The plaintiff sent a telegram from Baroda offering to purchase the said groundnut-cakes from the defendants. The defendants conveyed their acceptance to the plaintiff by telegram despatched from Kanpur and the said acceptance reached the plaintiff at Baroda in due course. The plaintiffs case was that the proposal or offer had been sent from Baroda and so a part of the cause of action had arisen in Baroda.

The plaintiff also pleaded that the acceptance had been received by him in Baroda and that again means in law that a part of the cause of action had arisen in Baroda. It is these two pleas that require consideration in the present appeal. The point thus raised prima facie appears to be short and simple; but it has led to conflict of judicial opinion amongst the Indian High Courts, and that is why Mr. Justice Shah, before whom this appeal was originally placed for final disposal, has referred it to a Division Bench.

3. Section 20 (c) provides that every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The expression "cause of action" has received judicial interpretation on numerous occasions. Every student of the Code is familiar with the explanation of this expression which describes it as a bundle of essential facts necessary to be proved by the plaintiff in order to succeed in his suit. This explanation appears to be clear and facile; but it is not always easy to decide which facts can legitimately enter this bundle and which must be excluded from it. The observations of Lord Justice Fry in -- Read v. Brown, (1888) 22 Q B D 128 at p. 132 (A) which explain the meaning of the expression "Cause of action" have now become a classic on the subject and are cited by every commentator on the Code of Civil Procedure:

"Everything," observed Lord Justice Fry "which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action."

Mr. Justice Brett put the same position in a somewhat different form in -- Cooke v. Gill, (1873) LR 8 CP 107 (B)

Click Here to Read the rest of this document