An employee's injury or death is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act if it arises out of and in the course of employment, even if the injury or death is caused by a natural force, such as a heat stroke, if the employment exposes the employee to a special risk of that injury or death.

Headnote:
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT - HEAT STROKE - SCULLION MOVING FROM COLD STORAGE TO KITCHEN - SUDDEN EXPOSURE TO HIGH TEMPERATURE - CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN ACCIDENT AND EMPLOYMENT - COMPENSATION AWARDED.
Fact of the Case:

A scullion on a ship suffered a heat stroke and died while working in high temperatures. He had to move frequently between the ice room, the kitchen, and the pantry, exposing him to sudden changes in temperature. The employer denied liability, arguing that the heat stroke was due to general weather conditions and not related to the employment.
Finding of the Court:

The court found that the scullion's employment exposed him to a special risk of heat stroke due to the sudden changes in temperature he experienced while moving between the ice room, the kitchen, and the pantry. This risk was an incident of his employment and arose out of it. The court also found that there was a causal connection between the heat stroke and the employment, as the scullion would not have suffered from it if he had not been exposed to the sudden changes in temperature.
Issues: 1. Whether the scullion's employment exposed him to a special risk of heat stroke. 2. Whether there was a causal connection between the heat stroke and the employment.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the scullion's employment exposed him to a special risk of heat stroke due to the sudden changes in temperature he experienced while moving between the ice room, the kitchen, and the pantry. This risk was an incident of his employment and arose out of it. The court also found that there was a causal connection between the heat stroke and the employment, as the scullion would not have suffered from it if he had not been exposed to the sudden changes in temperature.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, reversed the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, and directed the employer to pay compensation to the scullion's family.

Judgment -

1. This is an appeal by the original applicant, and it raises a point of law whether the accident which resulted in the death of the applicants son who was a scullion on a ship arose in the course of, and out of, his employment with the opposite party. Can a legal inference be drawn from the nature of the deceaseds employment that the said employment was a proximate cause of a heat stroke from which he suffered and on account of which he lost his life? If an employee works under cover, if the nature of his employment does not expose him directly to the rays of the sun, if the atmospheric temperature is 101 but the nature of the employment as a scullion requires the employee to move suddenly from the low temperature of a cold storage room to the atmospheric temperature of 101 and even higher temperature of a kitchen and if, while doing that duty, he suffers from heat stroke and dies, is a legal inference permissible that the accident arose out of his employment and was not due to the general weather conditions to which not only the employee, but all others in the same place were subject? These are questions which we have to answer in this case.

2. The facts which have given rise to this appeal may now be stated. The application has been made to recover a sum of Rs. 3500 from the opposite party Messrs. B. P. (India) Ltd. as compensation in respect of the death of the applicants son Joaquim Fernandes. Joaquim Fernandes was in the employment of the opposite party as a scullion on the S. S. British Chemist. His duties were (1) to wash the dishes, utensils and crockery; (2) to convoy food from the kitchen to the pantry and (3) to assist in serving morning tea to the officers in their cabins. While he was performing those duties on the 28th July 1953, when the ship was near Bahrein, he suffered from a heat stroke and collapsed. He went into coma. His temperature rose to 110 degrees. He was removed to the ice room, artificial respiration was restored to, but he died. The applicants contention is that the mishap of the heat stroke which resulted in the death of her son occurred when the deceased was in the course of employment of the opposite party and it arose out of the said employment and that, therefore, the opposite party is liable to pay compensation. In the written statement filed by the opposite party, the opposite party has denied that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased. According to the opposite party, the deceased died of a natural cause, viz. a heat stroke. The opposite party contends that the heat stroke was merely a consequence of the specially affected by the severity of the weather by reason of his employment and that his work did not in any manner contribute to his death. Accordingly, the opposite party submits that it is not liable to pay compensation to the applicant.

3. The learned Commissioner for Workmens Compensation observed in the course of his order that no evidence was led on behalf of the applicant to show that the work of the deceased exposed him to special risk of heat stroke. The learned Commissioner said that the deceased scullion had to work under cover, that he was not exposed to the rays of the sun or the heat of the engine room or the heat of the kitchen and that the character of his employment was not such as to create or intensify the risks that arise from extraordinary natural causes." The learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that the employment of the deceased did not expose him "to some peculiar or extraordinary danger" and therefore it could not be said that he died of an injury by accident. In his view, "the death of the deceased was not due to injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." Accordingly, he dismissed the application. From that order, the applicant has appealed.

4. Mr. Beynon for the opposite party opposes the appeal and contends that the atmospheric temperature on that day was 101 degrees which co

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