JUDGMENT - (1) This is first appeal arises out of an execution proceeding and it raises a question under clause (2) of Art 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. The question is as to the construction of the word appeal in clause (2) of Art 182. Does the word mead an appeal from the decree which is sought to be executed or would it include an appeal from an order having direct and immediate connection with the decree which is sought to be executed This is interesting point arises upon the following circumstances:

(2) The appellant plaintiff filed a suit, being Suit No. 15 of 1948 to set aside a certain sale deed which was passed by his father. The value of the property that was the subject matter of the sale deed was Rs. 17, 187-8-0 The dispute was referred to arbitration and the arbitrator made an award upon which a decree was based. The award decree was passed on 19-10-19500 and it was for the amount of Rs. 4,000/- the plaintiff filed a Miscellaneoous Application being Miscellaneous Application NO. 272 id 1949 Whereby the challenged the award decree dated 19-10-1950. He sought to have the award decree set aside. The abovementioned Miscellanioues Application No. 272 of 1949 was rejected on 10.10.1950. from the said order or rejection the plaintiff appealled to the High Court had the High court dismissed the appeal on . 8.7.1953. The present darkhast to execute the award decree was filed by the plaintiff on 11.11.1954.

(3) Now, the question arisming for consideration is as to what is the starting point of limitation upon the above facts. Would the starting point be 19-10-1950, the date upon which the award decree was passed, or would the limitation commence to run from 8-7-1953 the date upon which an order was made by the High court dismissing the appeal or the plaintiff from the order rejecting his Miscellaneous Application. No. 272 of 1949.

(4) The question of construction of Art. 182, clause (2) has been the subject matter of considerable discussion in several cases. But in my view all doubts upon the question of construction of the word appeal occuring in clause (2) of Art 182, have been set at rest by the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendranath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, 34 Bom LR 1065 that wqas a case in which a mortgage decree was passed on 24-6-1920. One of the decree holder, a mand named Madan Mohan , was disatisfied with the order of the learned subordinate Judge disallowing his claim to be substituted by any one of the decree holders whose rights he (Madan Mohan) Claimed to have acquired. Madan Mohan appealed to the High court and his appeal purported to be against the order of the subordinate judge dated 26-6-1920 rejecting his claim against his co plaintiff. It may be to the High court, he did not join the judgment debtors. In other words, the quarrel in the appeal which was filed in the High court by Madan Mohan was a quarrel bnetween the two plaintiffs, Madan Mohan stated in his appeal that no decree had been drawn up in the case and therefore he was appealling against the order of the subordinate judge. That however, was not true. The appeal, though irregular in form and insufficiently in execution of the orginal decree that was passed by the subordinate Judge, a question arose whether the terminus a quo was the date of the decision of the irregular appeal or the date of the orginal decree in suit, namely, 24-6-1920 Upon the matter going before their Lordships of the Privy Council, their Lordships observed:

The question must be decided upon the plain words of the article. Where there has been an appeal time is to run from the date of the decree of the appeallate court. There is in their Lordships opinion no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the words mean just what they say. The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such prov

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