Horwill, J.-The appellant mortgagee filed a suit for a declaration that although the consideration in the mortgage document was shown to be Rs.2,000 it was, in fact, only Rs.1,000. The Court found that this was so. On 27th March, 1941, the respondent, who is the sole executor of the will of the judgment-debtor, filed an application praying that he might be brought on record as the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, whom he reported to be dead. The learned Judge held that it had not been proved satisfactorily that the judgment-debtor was dead. Upon dismissing that application, he decreed the suit ex parte with costs. The respondent filed C.R.P.No.1834 of 1941 against the order dismissing his application to be brought on record; and this was dismissed on 6th January, 1943. The application E.P.No.304 of 1944 was filed on 17th July, 1944, and it is seen that this execution petition was filed more than three years after the passing of the decree in the suit, but well within three years of the date of the dismissal of the civil revision petition. The learned District Munsiff held that the application was barred by limitation. In appeal the. learned District Judge disposed of the matter very briefly by saying “there must be finality in matters of this kind.” The decree-holder appeals.

The sole question of limitation turns on the construction of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, which gives three years for the execution of a decree from (1) the date of the decree or order; or (2) where there has been an appeal, the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court. I have no doubt that if clause (2) of Article 182 had to be construed on a reading of that Article alone, without taking into consideration extraneous matters such as the application of logical principles and the anomalous results that would follow from a strict interpretation of this clause, clause (2) would be read as “where there has been an appeal against the decree or order”. If, however, clause (2) is read in that way, then various appeals-having very much the same effect as an appeal against a decree-would not extend time; e.g., an appeal or revision against an order setting aside, or refusing to set aside an ex parte decree; or, as here, an appeal against an interlocutory order which, if successful, would have the effect of setting aside a decree. If, however, one had to give a wider meaning to Article 182, clause (2), because certain illogical or inequitable results would follow from giving a strict interpretation to it, then one would feel bound to read that clause, as has been done in some cases, as meaning just what it says, i.e., any appeal, including an appeal against an order or decree passed in collateral proceedings. For example, a person not bound by the decree might file another suit raising the same question. Clearly the decree passed would be imperilled by the new suit and whatever be the result of that suit, an appeal might be filed and the result of the pending appeal would also imperil the decree. Similarly with regard to an appeal from a decree passed in a suit to set aside the decree on grounds of fraud and the like. If one is not to read clause (2) strictly, as referring to appeals against the decrees or order referred to in clause (1) the difficulty is to know where to draw the line. It has been clearly held that limitation does run against a decree-holder when collateral proceedings are pending. In those decisions in which a wider scope has been given to clause (2), the need for some sort of restriction on the meaning of the word “appeal” has been generally recognised. The application of this clause has generally been restricted to appeals against orders arising out of the proceedings themselves; such as appeals against a preliminary decree, where a final decree has to be executed; or against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte decree, or a revision petition against an order setting aside an ex parte decree. This restrict

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