JUDGMENT - (1) This petition raises a very short question as to the interpretation of the period of limitation provided under section 33A for the making of an application by the assessee for revision.

(2) The appellate Assistant Commissioner made the order on the 9th January 1956. The order was served upon the assessee on the 27th January 1956, and the assessee made the application for revision under section 33A on the 25th January 1957. the period of limitation is one year form the date of the order or within such further period as the Commissioner may think fit to allow on being satisfied that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within that period, and the contention of the Department is that limitation begins to run from the date of the order viz., the 9th January 1956, and in as much as the application was made on the 25th January 1957 the application is out of time. On the other hand, the contention of the assessee is that limitation begins to run from the date when the assessee came to know of the order, which is the 27th January 1956, and therefore his application is within time.

(3) Mr. Joshi has drawn our attention to various sections in the Income-Tax Act where the Legislature has expressly provided that limitation should run from the date of the service of the order, and Mr. Joshi says that if the Legislature in section 33A provides for limitation from the dated of the order. We must give effect to the legislative provision. What we have to decide is what is the meaning to be at ached to the word "order" used in the expression " from the date of order". If "order" means a unilateral arriving at a decision by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner without the person affected having any knowledge of that decision, then undoubtedly limitation would begin to run from the date when the Appellate Assistant Commissioner chooses to pass the order. In this view of the case, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may make the order, put it in a drawer, forget about it, and if a year has passed after it the right of the assessee to go in revision would be barred. Now that seems to us to be an entirely untenable contention. If the Legislature gave the right of revision to the assessee under section 33A it was an effective rights and if the Legislature provided a period of limitation that period must equally be as effective period. When we say "effective" what we mean is that the whole period must be permitted to the person affected by the order within which he can prefer the application for revision. The assessee should know that he has a years time with in which to make up his mind whether he should apply for revision or not. If Mr. Joshis contention were to be accepted, we would be driven to this extraordinary conclusion that the period of limitation provided by the Legislature could be cut down by the action of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner could at his sweet will determine what the period of limitation was. He need not promulgate the order for a month, two months or six months, and the period of limitation would depend upon when he chose to intimate to the party affected the nature of his order. Surely that could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Mr. Joshis answer is that the Commissioner has the power to condone delay for sufficient cause. But if the period of limitation itself is cut down by the action of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, then it could not be said that if the assessee did not exercise his right within that time that constituted sufficient cause for condemnation of delay by the Commissioner. Sufficient cause must mean a cause which prevented the assessee from preferring his application for revision within the time permitted by the section. The assessee could not possibly urge that he had sufficient cause for preferring his application on the 25th January 1957 because the order was saved upon him on the 27th Janu

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