The construction and maintenance of railway tracks falls within the definition of 'road' under Entry 7 of Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

Headnote:
MINIMUM WAGES ACT - CONSTRUCTION OR MAINTENANCE OF ROADS - RAILWAY TRACKS - INTERPRETATION - CONDONATION OF DELAY - JURISDICTION - DISCRETION - JUDICIAL REVIEW - [MINIMUM WAGES ACT, 1948, SECTIONS 2(B), 2(E), 2(G), 3, 5, 12, 13, 14, 20, SCHEDULE, ENTRY 7]
Fact of the Case:

The petitioners, representing the Central Railway Administration, challenged two orders passed by the respondent authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The respondents, employed by the petitioners, claimed wages for construction and maintenance of railway tracks from 1952 to 1963. The petitioners contended that the construction and maintenance of railway tracks did not fall within the definition of 'road' under Entry 7 of Part I of the Schedule to the Act, and that the authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application. The respondents sought condonation of delay in filing the application, arguing that they were unaware of their rights until 1957 when Entry 7 was amended to include 'construction or maintenance of roads'.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the construction and maintenance of railway tracks fell within the definition of 'road' under Entry 7 of Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The court interpreted the term 'road' broadly to include any line of communication used by vehicles, including railways. The court also upheld the authority's decision to condone the delay in filing the application, finding that the respondents had shown sufficient cause for the delay and that the authority had exercised its discretion judicially.
Issues: 1. Whether the construction and maintenance of railway tracks falls within the definition of 'road' under Entry 7 of Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948? 2. Whether the authority had jurisdiction to entertain the application? 3. Whether the authority erred in condoning the delay in filing the application?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the term 'road' broadly to include any line of communication used by vehicles, including railways. The court considered the ordinary meaning of the word 'road' as well as the purpose and object of the Minimum Wages Act in reaching this conclusion. 2. The court held that the authority had jurisdiction to entertain the application because the construction and maintenance of railway tracks fell within the definition of 'road' under Entry 7 of Part I of the Schedule to the Act. 3. The court upheld the authority's decision to condone the delay in filing the application, finding that the respondents had shown sufficient cause for the delay and that the authority had exercised its discretion judicially.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition and upheld the orders passed by the respondent authority. The authority was directed to proceed with the application on merits.

JUDGMENT - Nain, J.

1. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the Union of India as representing the Central Railway Administration for writs of certiorari and prohibition, praying for quashing of two orders made by the Respondent No. 1 the Authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, for Neral area. The said authority is also the Civil Judge, Junior Division, at Karjat in Kolaba District. The respondents Nos. 2 to 201 are alleged to have been employed with the Central Railway Administration during the period from 1st April 1952 to 31st December 1963 on construction and maintenance of railway tracks.

2. The facts leading to this petition briefly stated are that the respondents Nos. 2 to 201 filed against the petitioners on 24th January 1964 an application before the respondent No. 1, being Application No. 1 of 1964, for recovery of wages alleged to be due to the said respondents being the difference between the minimum wages fixed by the Central Government under the Minimum Wages Act, 11 of 1948 and the wages alleged to have been paid to them. They also claimed overtime wages alleging that the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 prescribed work for 8 hours a day, whereas they had been made to work for 81/2 hours per day. The respondents alleged that their rate of pay as fixed under the Act was Rs. 225 per day, whereas they had actually been paid at the rate of Rs. 1.75 per day. They claimed this difference of 50 P. per day each for the period from 1st April 1952 to 31st December 1963. For the same period they claimed overtime allowance for half an hour per day. Their total claim aggregated to Rs. 7,05,000/-. As the period of limitation for making such application is prescribed under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, and is a period of six months from the time that the wages become due, the respondents Nos. 2 to 201 realised that their claim for major part of their time would be barred by limitation. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 makes a provision for condonation of delay. The respondents Nos. 2 to 201, therefore, made an application for condonation of delay. The grounds that they alleged for the condonation of delay. The grounds that they alleged for the condonation of delay. The respondents Nos. 2 to 201, therefore, made an application for condonation of delay. The grounds that they alleged for the condonation of delay were, firstly, that their employment was on the construction and maintenance of roads and in building operations within the meaning of Entry No. 7 in Part I of the Schedule to the said Act of 1957 which came in force in September 1957 and they could not have made the application earlier than that. For explaining the delay for the remaining period up to the date of the application, they stated that they had been carrying on correspondence with the authorities stated that they were considering the claim and, therefore, they could not make an application earlier. The respondent No. 1 delivered a judgment in the said application on 25th April 1964 condoning the delay in making the claim for the period from 1st February 1956. The respondents application was thereafter numbered as Appellation No. 7 of 1964 and the petitioners filed a written statement on merits wherein they inter alia contended that the nature of the alleged employment of the respondents Nos. 2 to 201 did not fall within any one of the entries in Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The petitioners, therefore, contended that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the remaining respondents. The respondent No. 1 thereafter heard submissions made by both the parties and delivered a judgment on 19th January 1965, holding that the respondents Nos. 2 to 201 were employed for the purpose of construction or maintenance of roads or for building operations within the meaning of Entry No. 7, in Part I of the Schedule to the Act. The respondent No. 1 further held that the word

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