Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is the residuary article and applies to suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule to the Act.

Headnote:
LIMITATION ACT - ARTICLE 120 - ARTICLE 62 - ARTICLE 145 - SUIT FOR REFUND OF SECURITY DEPOSIT - APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION PERIOD.
Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit to recover a sum of money deposited as security for the performance of a contract with the State of Kolhapur. The contract was completed in 1946, and the amount became payable. The suit was filed in 1958, more than 12 years after the cause of action arose.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that Article 62 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a three-year limitation period for suits for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, was not applicable because the money was not received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use at the time it was received. The court also held that Article 145, which prescribes a thirty-year limitation period for suits against a depositary or pawnee to recover movable property deposited or pawned, was not applicable because the suit was not for the recovery of movable property.
Issues: 1. Which article of the Limitation Act, 1908, was applicable to the suit: Article 62, Article 120, or Article 145?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Article 120, the residuary article, was applicable to the suit. Article 120 prescribes a six-year limitation period for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule to the Limitation Act. The court reasoned that the money was deposited by way of security for the due performance of a contract and was refundable after the completion of the contract. Therefore, the suit was not for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, and Article 62 was not applicable. The court also held that the suit was not for the recovery of movable property deposited or pawned, and Article 145 was not applicable.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the District Court, and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court. The defendants were ordered to pay the costs throughout.

JUDGMENT - Nain, J.

1. This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree dated 14th March 1961 of the learned Assistant Judge, Kolhapur, allowing the defendants appeal and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of limitation.

2. The plaintiff had filed the suit from which this appeal arises in the court of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kolhapur, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,319-8-6, interest and costs on the following facts: Messrs. Dhavate and Rote had filled in a tender for supplies with the Director of Civil Supplies, Kolhapur State. The tender was accepted by two letters dated 9th November 1944 and 8th January 1945. Under the terms of the contract, 10% of the amount payable to Messrs. Dhavate and Rote was to be deducted and paid to them on completion of the contract. The contract was completed in the year 1946. Kolhapur State thereafter merged in the then State of Bombay and was later succeeded by the State of Maharashtra. By a letter dated 27th May 1949 the Civil Supplies Department, Kolhapur wrote to Messrs. Dhavate and Rote informing them that a sum of Rs. 2,079-9-1 was due to them and asking them to send a receipt signed jointly by Dhavate and Rote and to receive the amount This amount was, however, not drawn by Messrs. Dhavate and Rote.

3. Rote filed a suit against Dhavate on the Original Bide of the Bombay High Court and obtained a decree for Rs. 1,039-12-6. In execution of the decree, the amount in the hands of the Director of Civil Supplies Kolhapur was attached. As Collector of Kolhapur disputed the liability, a receiver was appointed to file a suit for recovery of the amount. Accordingly in 19S8, Suit No. 443 of 1958 was filed by the plaintiff as receiver against the State of Maharash-tra. The defendants inter alia contended that the suit was time barred. The learned trial Judge held that the article 145 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribed a period of thirty years applied and the suit was not time barred. The trial Court accordingly decreed the plaintiffs suit for a sum of Rs. 1.039-78 and costs and interest.

4. Against the said decision, the defendants filed an appeal in the District Court at Kolhapur. The learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal held that Art. 145 of the Limitation Act was not applicable, but in the opinion of the learned Assistant Judge, Article 62 was applicable which prescribed a period of three years. He held that the suit of the plaintiff was time barred. He allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Against the said decision, the present appeal has been filed.

5. The only point argued in this appeal before us is as to which of the Articles 62, 120 and 145 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was applicable to the suit. The contention of the plaintiff Is that Article 145 or in the alternative Article 120 is applicable while the defendants contend that Article 62 is applicable.

6. Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908, prescribes a period of three years for a suit for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiffs use. The time from which the period begins to run is when the money is received. Article 145 prescribes a period of thirty years for a suit against a depositary or pawnee to recover movable property deposited or pawned. The time from which the period begins to run Is the date of the deposit or pawn. Article 120 is the residuary article and prescribes a period of six years for suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The time from which the period begins to run is when the right to sue accrues.

7. In our opinion, Article 145 has no application to the facts of this case. The suit is for recovery of an amount deposited under a contract which became payable when the contract was completed. It is not a suit against a depositary or pawnee to recover mova

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Judicial Analysis