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IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.R.Bhole, J.
Appellants: The Union of India through the General Manager, Central Railway, Bombay
Vs.
Respondent: Vithalsa Kisansa and Co.
Civil Revn. Appln. No. 38 of 1966 Decided On: 22.01.1970
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K.V. Tambey, Adv.
LIMITATION ACT - ARTICLE 31 - SECTION 31 - CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CONSIGNEE AND RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF LIMITATION PERIOD FOR SUIT AGAINST CARRIER FOR NON-DELIVERY OF GOODS.
Fact of the Case:
A suit was filed against the Central Railway for compensation for non-delivery of three ginger bags booked at Ottappalam on the Southern Railway to be carried to and delivered to the consignee at Akola on the Central Railway. The consignment never reached Akola and was not delivered. The consignee filed a suit against the Central Railway claiming a decree for compensation on 11-8-1964.
Finding of the Court:
The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit, holding that the starting point of limitation was not the date on which the goods should have reached the destination, but the date of the last letter of correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration, which was 12-8-1963.
Issues: Whether the correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration could extend the period of limitation under Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court in Bootamal v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1716, held that the starting point of limitation under Article 31 is after reasonable time has elapsed for the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. Correspondence between the parties which only shows that the railway was trying to trace the goods or making inquiries will not alter the starting point of limitation. Only correspondence which amounts to an acknowledgment of the liability of the carrier or throws light on the question of determining the reasonable time for carriage of goods may be taken into account.
Final Decision: The court set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, holding that the correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration did not come within the categories of the nature of correspondence that are mentioned by the Supreme Court and did not extend the period of limitation.
2. The defendant denied the claim and contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed because it was barred by limitation. The suit was not filed within one year from 22-10-1962 when the consignment ought to have been delivered. The trial Court considered the plea and came to the conclusion that there was some correspondence between the plaintiff and the railway administration and that it continued upto 12-8-1963. By this correspondence full information had been called for. The correspondence showed that an enquiry was being made and the railway administration had not expressed its inability to make delivery of the consignment. Ac-cording to the trial Court, the starting point of limitation cannot be the date on which the goods should have reached the destination, but the date of the last letter which is 12-8-1963. He has relied upon a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court. Mutsaddi Lal v. G. G in Council, AIR 1952 All 897 (FB). Accordingly therefore, he decreed the plaintiffs suit. This decree is challenged here. The point, therefore, that arises here for consideration is to see whether this decree is legal and proper.
3. I have seen the correspondence between the plaintiff consignee and the railway administration and that correspondence appears to be for the purpose of supporting the claim of the plaintiff-consignee. The correspondence is neither on the point of the goods reaching late to the place of destination, nor does it show that there was any acknowledgement later on, of the liability by the railways. We have, therefore, to see whether this correspondence would help the plaintiff by extending the period of limitation. In AIR 1952 All 897 (FB), the Allahabad High Court seems to have taken a view that if the goods do not reach the destination on the date when in the normal course of affairs they are expected to reach there and the railway administration on being approached for delivery holds out a hope to the plaintiff that the goods would be delivered and that the matter was being inquired into, then the starting point of limitation under Article 31 of the Indian Limitation Act could not be said to be the date on which the goods should have reached the destination in the normal course. According to that High Court, the phrase "when the goods ought to be delivered" in Article 31 means, the point of time at which the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods or the date when the carrier informs the consignee that it would be delivered or when the carrier communicates to the consignee its liability to deliver the goods or a reasonable date that may be fixed on a consideration of events subsequent to the handing over of the consignment to the carrier for carriage. So far as the instant case before me is concerned, there was neither an undertaking by the railway administration nor a contract between the parties to deliver the goods on a particular date. There is nothing on record also to show that the carrier informed the consignee that it would be delivered on a particular date. There is nothing also on record to show that the Railways informed the consignee their inability to deliver the goods. Now, can our case be said to be a case wherein a reasonable date could be fixed on a consideration of events subsequent to the handing over of the consignment to the carrier for carriage. Except for the c
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