SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
27th March, 1962.
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K.N. WANCHOO JJ.
Boota Mal, Appellant
Versus
Union of India, Respondent.
Civil Appeal. No. 507 of 1960.
Advocates appeared
Mr. K. L Gosain, Senior Advocate, (Mr. R. Ganapathy Iyer, Advocate and Mr. G. Gopalakrishnan, Advocate of M/s. Gagrat and Co., with him), for Appellant; Mr. B. Sea, Senior Advocate, (Mr. P. D. Menon, Advocate, with him), for Respondent.
Judgment
WANCHOO, J. : This appeal on a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court raises a question as to the interpretation of Art. 31 of the Limitation Act. The appellant had brought a suit in forma pauperis for recovery of a sum of over Rs. 24,000 from the Union of India in connection with non-delivery of certain goods booked with the railway. The appellant was trading in Gujranwala, which is now in Pakistan, under the name and style of G. M. Bootamal and Company and also under the name and style of Gopal Metal Rolling Mills and Company, he being the sole proprietor of both. On August 5, 1947, just before the partition the appellant handed over live consignments to the North Western Railway at Gujranwala for carriage to Jagadhari and these consignments were booked on the same day by two railway receipts. The consignments however did not reach Jagadhari. The appellant made inquiries and when no delivery was made he made a claim on the railway on November 30, 1947 for the price of the goods not delivered. Later, on January 22, 1948, the appellant gave notice to the railway under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which it was said that the goods booked under the two railway receipts had not been delivered in spite of repeated reminders and demands from the officials concerned. It was further said that the value of the goods booked was Rs. 24,189-4-0 and that the railway was liable for this loss which was due to the negligence of the railway. It was further stated that the cause of action arose on 21st and 30th August, 1947 and on subsequent dates when the appellant met with refusal. It was finally said that if the amount was not paid a suit would be brought against the railway. It seems however that in spite of this notice correspondence went on between the appellant and the railway and on December 1, 1948, the railway informed the appellant that the two consignments were still lying at Gujranwala and that their despatch had been withheld by the North Western Railway due to restrictions imposed by the Pakistan Government on export. The railway therefore requested the appellant to secure a permit from the Chief Controller, Exports and Imports, Karachi and also from the Custodian of Evacuee Property West Punjab and to send the same to the Station Master Gujranwala to enable the goods being sent to Jagadhari. The appellant was also told that in case he failed to produce the requisite permits the consignments would be disposed of in accordance with the law in force in Pakistan, and the railway administration would not be responsible for any loss, damage or destruction in the goods. This seems to have been the end of the correspondence between the railway and the appellant, and the appellant brought the present suit on December 13, 1949.
2. The suit was resisted by the Union of India and a number of defences were raised with which we are however not concerned in the present appeal. As many as seven issues were framed by the trial court, the most important being of limitation. We trial court found in favour of the appellant on all the issues including limitation and gave him a decree for Rupees 24, 189-4-0. It however ordered the parties to bear their own costs.
3. Thereupon there was an appeal by the respondent to the High Court, and the main point pressed there was that the suit as filed on December 13, 1949 was barred by limitation. Under Art. 31 of the Limitation Act time begins to run against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of or delay in delivering goods from the time when the goods ought to be delivered." The question canvassed in the High Court was the interpretation of these words in Article 31. It appears that there had been difference of opinion in the High Courts as to the meaning to be attached to these words in Art. 31 and a reference had been made to a Full Bench in another case, namely, Dominion of India v. Firm Aminchand Bholanath, C. A. No. 97 of 1949, D/-2-5-1956. In that reference the Full Ben
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