The determination of the lease in respect of the land on which the license was created terminates the possession of a licensee.

Headnote:
LANDLORD AND TENANT - BOMBAY RENTS, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT, 1947 - SECTION 12(3) - LEASE DEED - CONSTRUCTION - PERMISSION TO ERECT STRUCTURE AND INDUCT THIRD PARTIES - STATUS OF OCCUPANTS OF STRUCTURE - LICENSEES - EVICTION OF LESSEE - EFFECT ON OCCUPANTS OF STRUCTURE.
Fact of the Case:

The respondent filed a suit under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) against the original judgment-debtor for possession of a plot of land. The lease deed prohibited sub-letting but permitted the lessee to erect structures and induct third parties. The petitioners were inducted into the structure erected by the original judgment-debtor. The trial court discharged the obstructionist notice, holding that the petitioners were entitled to remain as tenants of the structure. The appellate court allowed the appeal and held that the petitioners were not entitled to remain in occupation of the structure.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the petitioners were not entitled to remain in occupation of the structure and in execution of the decree which is passed in respect of the land on which the said structure is raised, they will have to be necessarily evicted.
Issues: Whether the persons who had been inducted in a superstructure on a land which was the subject-matter of the lease could be regarded as sub-tenants of the land and whether they were protected under provisions of the Bombay Rent Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the petitioners were not entitled to remain in occupation of the structure because: * The original lessee has to be evicted pursuant to the decree passed in the suit preferred by the respondent. * The original lessee has to be evicted from the entire land which was the subject-matter of the lease which has now been determined. * The persons inducted in the superstructure were no doubt the tenants of the superstructure which was erected. * The status of the persons who were inducted, though legally, in the superstructure vis-a-vis the land is necessarily that of licensees and not of any other higher status. * The decree which is being executed by the respondent cannot be properly executed unless the status of the petitioners as licensees on the land also comes to an end.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition and held that the petitioners had to be evicted from the suit land.

JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is by 14 persons who are obstructing the execution of a decree obtained by the respondent in a suit being F.A.E. R. Suit No. 124/856 of 1964 filed by the latter in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. The said suit had been filed against Shivnarayan and Surajmal under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Bombay Rent Act") for possession of a plot of land which had been originally given to the aforementioned Shivnarayan under a registered lease deed dated 29th September, 1962. Under the said lease deed the respondent had prohibited the said Shivnarayan from sub-letting the plot without his prior permission, but a clause in the lease deed had permitted the said Shivnarayan to erect structures which he was allowed to let out to third parties.

2. The suit, however, had been filled on the ground, among others, that the said Shivnarayan was guilty of arrears of rent for more than six months and that the respondent was entitled to a decree under section 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. The trial Court passed a decree on 27th November, 1974. An appeal, being Appeal No. 183 of 1975, preferred, by the said Shivnarayan and Surajmal came to be dismissed by the Appeal Court because the appellants did not comply with certain orders passed by the Appellate Court.

3. Thereafter the respondent took out execution proceedings and in these execution proceedings, the petitioners have caused obstruction. The respondent, therefore, took out Obstructionist Notice No. 157 of 1976 for the removal of the obstruction on the ground that the petitioners are claiming through the judgement debtors and they had no right to remain in possession of the property. The petitioners, however, resisted the obstructionist notice by contending that they had been lawfully let in the structure erected by the original judgement-debtor under the express permission granted by the lease deed itself. According to them, the lease deed not only did not prohibit but specifically permitted the original tenant to construct a structure and to induct third parties into the said structure. If this permission given under the lease deed is properly interpreted and if the action of the original judgement-debtor is appreciated in the light of this provision contained in the lease deed, then the petitioners would be tenants of the structure which had been erected on the land originally let out to the judgement-debtor. The thrust of the arguments on behalf of the petitioners in the Court of first instance was that being thus legal tenants of the structure, they could not be evicted in execution of a decree which was obtained by the respondent in respect of the open plot of land only.

4. The learned trial Judge by his judgment and order dated 5th April, 1980 discharged the obstructionist notice by holding that the petitioners were entitled to remain as tenants of the structure and after the removal of the original judgment-debtor, they became the tenants of the respondent. This order was challenged by the respondent in appeal, being Appeal No. 309 of 1980 which was heard and allowed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Cause Court by its order dated 7th September, 1983. The judgment is fairly elaborate and has dealt with every argument before the Appellate Bench raised on behalf of both the petitioners and the respondent.

5. Though the law which had to be interpreted by the Appellate Bench in the year 1983 has become well settled, in view of the arguments advanced and in view of probably the stakes involved, the Appellate Bench thought it fit to bestow more than normal attention upon the case which came up before it and, therefore, dealt with the questions in a fairly elaborate judgment.

6. From the facts which I have already mentioned above, it is clear that the original judgement-debtor was a lessee of the land given to him under

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