IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(AURANGABAD BENCH)
Chapalgaonkar N.P., J.
Govindrao Sopanrao Kadam ..... Petitioner.
Versus
Gopinath Vithalrao Saware another..... Respondents.
Civil Revision Application No. 1086 of 1992, decided on 25-2-1993.
Advocates appeared :
G.N. Patil, for petitioner.
V.R. Sonwalkar, for respondent No. 1.
See, Limitation Act, 1963, Section 15.
Section 15-Civil Procedure Code. 1908, Order 21 - Rule 95-Execotion of decree-Application for-Possession application under Order 21. Rule 95 by auction purchaser not application for execution of decree-Benefit of Section 15, Limitation Act not be available regarding such application.
The very purpose of providing a separate Article prescribing limitation different from the limitation prescribed for execution of the decree indicates that the legislature was not in favour of treating an application for possession filed by an auction purchaser under Order 21, Rule 95 to be an application of execution decree. Otherwise these different provisions of Article 134 and Article 136 were unnecessary.
If the legislature would have considered application of auction purchaser for possession of auctioned property as an application for execution, it would not have prescribed different periods of limitation to them. The judgment of the Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Sahu Deoki Nandan v. Narendra Kumar, in AIR 1974 All 144 stands overruled by implication in view of tee Supreme Court judgment in, Ganpat Singhs case (AIR 1987 SC 1443).
Once it is held that the application of auction-purchaser for possession is not an application for execution of decree, it follows that exclusion of the period of limitation under Section 15 is not available in computing the limitation for such application under Order 21, Rule 95.
2. In Regular Civil Suit No. 54 of 1981 Gangubai obtained a decree for maintenance against her husband Govindrao. In execution of said decree, agricultural land Block No. 222 admeasuring 69 Ares was attached and sold by public auction. Respondent No. 1-Gopinath purchased this property at the Court auction. The said sale was confirmed on 20-12-1986. An appeal against this confirmation was filed by the judgment debtor on 19-1-1987 and on the very day, the operation of the order of confirmation of sale was stayed by the Appellate Court. On 19-4-1991, the said appeal came to be dismissed and the stay granted by the Appellate Court was vacated. A Second Appeal arising therefrom was also filed in the High Court and this Second Appeal No. 247 of 1989 was dismissed on 21-8-1991.
3. Auction purchaser Gopinath filled an application for possession of auctioned property under Order XXI, Rule 95 on 6-12-1991. This application was objected on various grounds which included the ground of limitation. Learned executing Judge was pleased to allow the application under Order XXI, Rule 95 and issue warrant of possession vide his Order dated 24-9 1992, which has been challenged in this revision.
4. I heard Shri G.N. Patil, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Shri V.R. Sonwalkar, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 served.
5. Two questions arise for consideration. First is regarding the starting point of limitation under Article 134 and the second is whether exclusion under section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is available in the instant case.
6. I will first deal with the applicability of section 15(1) of the Limitation Act to the present proceedings. Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:
15(1).—In computing the period of limitation of any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
It is clear that the exclusion of the period during which injunction or order of the Court had stayed the relief to be sought is available only in case of a suit or application for execution of a decree. Whether an application under Order XXI, Rule 95 by auction purchaser is an application for the execution of the decree is the question. Formerly, there were divergent views on the point. The High Courts of Madras and Calcutta had held that an application for possession by auction purchaser is not an application to execute the decree. See I.L.R. (32) 1909 Mad. 136, (Sultan Sahib Marakayar others v. Chidambaram Chettiar another)1, A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 979 (2); (Maddala Ayydu v. Tanikalla Subbama and others)2, A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 333, (Jateendra Chandra Bandopadhayay others v. Rebateemohan Das others)3, whereas a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in (Sahu Deoki Nandan v. Narendra Kumar another)4, A.I.R. 1974 All. 144 had taken a view that an application for execution of a decree includes an application by auction purchaser for the delivery of possession. Now, the controversy appears to have been resolved by the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Ganpat Singh (dead) by L.Rs. v. Kailash Shankar others)5, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1443. Supreme Court was pleased to hold that an application under Order XXI, Rule 95 cannot be construed to be an application for execution of decree. It observed thus:
“An application for delivery of possession of immovable property purchased in execution cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as an application for execution of a decree for possession of property so as to invoke the provision of Article 136, Limitation Act. Merely because the auction-purchaser will be deemed to be a party in t
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