JUDGMENT - B.H. MARLAPALLE, J.:---The Head Mistress of the school, run by the applicant society, had challenged her reversion effected by an order dated 1-11-1999, in Regular Civil Suit No. 58/1999, before the Civil Judge (Senior) Division, Nanded and her application for interim relief was rejected. She had gone in appeal before the District Court unsuccessfully and filed Civil Revision Application No. 930/1999 which came to be disposed of by this Court with liberty to approach the Schools Tribunal under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short M.E.P.S. Act). The applicant society has filed the instant review application, contending therein that the view taken by this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 930/1999 that civil suit was not tenable before the Civil Court is contrary to the view taken earlier by this Court (Dr. Saraf, J.) in the case of (Rasta Peth Education Society, Pune v. Pethkar Udhav Bhimashankar)1, 1994(4) Bom.C.R. 410 and therefore, the order passed by this Court is required to be reviewed.

2.This Court in Rasta Peth Education Society's case, after referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of (Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.)2, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78. (Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke)3, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2238 and (Rajaramkumar Bhargav v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 752, held that there is nothing in the scheme of the M.E.P.S. Act to justify and infer implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and it is open to the suitor to select one of the two fora viz. an appeal under the M.E.P.S. Act or a civil suit before the Civil Court and if the teacher opts for a civil suit, the remedy available under the M.E.P.S. Act, by way of an appeal, will not operate as a bar. This ratio implies that the remedy provided under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act of filing of an appeal, against an order of termination, dismissal or otherwise removal or reduction in rank or supersession will not operate as a bar against filing of a suit under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging such orders. Referring to the provisions of section 12 of the M.E.P.S. Act, this Court in Rasta Peth Education Society's case held that what is barred under the said section is suit, appeal or otherwise regular proceedings in any Court or tribunal in respect of the matters decided by the tribunal and section 12 does not prohibit suit or other proceedings in any Civil Court in any matter for which appeal has been provided under the said Act.

3.Section 9 of the C.P.C. states that the courts shall (subject to the provisions therein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except the suites of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The Apex Court in the case of Dhulabhai (supra) laid down some summary principles regarding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and amongst them, following two are relevant:

"(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunal, the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a civil suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. In the latter

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