Kalavati Bharsingh Thapa vs Maharashtra Plastic Industries

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2004 Supreme(Bom) 1141

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Khandeparkar R.M.S., J.
Kalavati Bharsingh Thapa .... Petitioner.
Versus
Maharashtra Plastic Industries.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 2492 of 2001, decided on 11/12-8-2004.
Advocates appeared :
N.M. Ganguli with Poojarey, for petitioner.
R.S. Pai i/b. Sanjay Udeshi Co., for respondents.

Headnote:Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 - Section 30(2) Proviso - Exercise of power of review. - Courts acting under Act, 1971 can exercise power of review under proviso to Section 30(2) of Act, in relation to interim orders. - If one peruses the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, it is apparent that a Court disposing the matters under the said Act is not empowered to review its judgment. Undoubtedly, proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 30 speaks of review of interim orders. However, the same is restricted to the cases of interim orders. Secondly the expression "review" used in the said provision of law is to be understood bearing in mind the nature of the orders which are contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 30 itself. Considering the same, the review contemplated under the said proviso is in the nature of the review provided under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to the ex parte temporary injunction orders or interim orders passed thereunder. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 clearly speaks of interim orders during the pendency of the main proceedings under the said Act. Proviso clearly specifies the review of "interim order". Being so, merely because the Courts acting under the said Act are empowered to review the interim order under the said proviso that would not entitle the Court to exercise such power in relation to the final orders passed at the conclusion of the proceedings under the said Act. Once the Court disposes the proceedings before it with final order, it renders itself functus officio in relation to such proceedings, and being so, in the absence of specific power to review, the order passed finally disposing of the matter, the Courts under the said Act do not enjoy inherent power like the one available in the Courts with plenary jurisdiction and, therefore, cannot review such final orders. In the case in hand, it is not in dispute that the matter was finally disposed of by the Labour Court by its judgment and order dated 20th April, 1994, and the review was sought on the ground that certain documents were not brought to the notice of the Labour Court when it disposed of the complaint. It was not sought on the ground of any error apparent on the face of record. That apart, in the absence of power of review being given to the Labour Court, as already stated above, there was no question of Labour Court entertaining the review application.

JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:-Heard the learned Advocate for the parties. Perused the records.

2. The short point which arises for consideration is that on final disposal of the complaint under MRTU PULP Act, 1971, (hereinafter called as “the said Act”) whether the Labour Court would have the power to review its judgment. The facts of the case disclose that the workman filed the complaint under the said Act before the Labour Court alleging unfair labour practice under Item No. 1 of Schedule IV of the said Act. After hearing the parties, the Labour Court by its order dated 20th April, 1994 directed reinstatement of the workman with continuity in service and full back wages from 6th December, 1984. The respondents filed an application for review of the said order being Misc. Review Application (ULP) No. 10 of 1994. The same was allowed by the Labour Court by its order dated 15th July, 1994. The workman filed revision application being Application (ULP) No. 1000 of 1994 before the Industrial Court which came to be rejected by an order dated 27th October, 1999. The workman thereafter filed the Review Application being Application (ULP) No. 26 of 1999 before the Industrial Court. However, the same came to be dismissed on 1st March, 2001. During the pendency of the review application, the workman expired on 7th March, 2000 and thereafter, the petitioner was brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased workman. The grievance of the petitioner is that the Labour Court after disposing of the complaint on merits, has sought to entertain the review application at the instance of the opponent in the said complaint on the ground that certain documents were not brought to the notice of the Labour Court at the time of the disposal of the said complaint.

3. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that there is no provision empowering the Labour Court to review its judgment passed in the complaint filed under the said Act. A limited power of review available under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the said Act, relates to the interim orders passed in such complaint and not to the final order disposing the complaint, and therefore, the Labour Court is not empowered to review the final judgment passed in the complaint. On the other hand, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents placing reliance in the decisions of the Apex Court in (Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 606, and in the matter of (Union of India another v. Ashwani Kumar)2, reported in 1994(1) L.L.J. 677, and of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of (Mafatlal Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Mafatlal Engg. Industries Employees Union ors.)3, reported in 1992(Supp.) Bom.C.R. 756, submitted that the power to review can be exercised in two distinct senses, (i) a procedural review and (ii) a review on merits. Considering the fact that the relevant documents and the Metropolitan Magistrates order, based on which earlier judgment was passed were infact stayed, and the said fact was not brought to the notice of the Labour Court earlier, and was sought to be brought to the notice of the Labour Court in review petition, the same would amount to a procedural review, applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank (supra), and therefore, no fault can be found with the order passed by the Labour Court.

4. It is well settled law that the power of review can be exercised only in cases where the statute, which governs the Court proceedings, permits the exercise of such power. The power to review has always been a creature of statute. Unless such power is provided by the statute, the Court cannot review its judgment. Of course, the order passed inadvertently or the one obtained by fraud or on false representation could be an exception to the said rule. Nevertheless, the review cannot be ordered on the ground of the judgment being wrong on merits

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2004 Supreme(Bom) 1141

Cases Referred (2)