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2004 Supreme(Bom) 979

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Chandrachud D.J. (Dr.), J.
Anandilal Ganesh Podar Society another .... Petitioner.
Versus
V. Chakravarti another.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 1489 of 1991, decided on 15-7-2004.
Advocates appeared :
Ms. A.B. Shah, for petitioners.
S.K. Talsania with J.S. Saluja i/b. M.V. Kini Co., for respondent.

Headnote:Constitution Of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court - Exercise of - Finding arrived by School Tribunal - Perverse - View formed by Tribunal on issue of law contrary to law laid down by High Court - View of facts not sustainable by evidence on record - Such perverse findings warrants interference by High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution. - Court of the view that both as a matter of law and on facts, the finding which has been arrived at by the School Tribunal is perverse and warrants interference by the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction this Court is conscious of the need to exercise the jurisdiction sparingly. Ordinarily, the Court would not do so unless inter alia the finding is perverse or it is not borne by the evidence on the record. The view which has been formed by the Tribunal on the issue of law before it is contrary to the law laid down by this Court and the view on facts is clearly not sustainable by the evidence on the record. In the circumstances, the petitioners are entitled to succeed. The petition is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the School Tribunal dated 16th January, 1991 is quashed and set aside.

       Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 - Section 7 - Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, Rule 40 - Constitution of India, Article 226 - Resignation by employee. - Resignation by employee (teacher) with immediate effect accepted by Management, cannot be withdrawn. - The resignation in the letter dated 6th June, 1989 was submitted by the 1st respondent teacher stating that she be relieved immediately. The resignation was accepted by the management on 13th June, 1989. She stated that she was ready to pay compensation in lieu of notice and sought "a good reference" subject however to the payment of three months’ salary in lieu of the period of notice. The School Tribunal was of the view that the letter could have been withdrawn within a period of three months. The question of withdrawal may arise where the resignation is furnished with effect from a prospective date. In a case such as the present, where the letter of resignation was with immediate effect and was accepted by the management, evidently there was no question of the resignation being withdrawn upon its acceptance. The resignation was sought to be withdrawn over three months after it was written on 6th June, 1989. The resignation having been accepted on 13th June, 1989, the withdrawal purportedly on 25th August, 1989 was of no legal effect. There was no evidence of physical duress. There was no evidence of circumstances that would indicate that the Will of the first respondent or her capacity to make a free and voluntary decision had been overborne. In the circumstances, both as a matter of law and on facts, the finding which had been arrived at by the School Tribunal that resignation of the first respondent was not voluntary was perverse and warranted interference by the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the School Tribunal dated 16th January, 1991 is quashed and set aside.

       Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 - Rule 40 - Resignation of employee. - Letter of resignation of employee with immediate effect, accepted by Management, cannot be withdrawn. - Section 7, it must be noted, does not prescribe any requirement of a notice when a resignation is submitted by an employee of a private school. The requirement of a notice is prescribed by Rule 40 which stipulates the giving of three calender months’ notice by a permanent employee and one month’s notice by a non-permanent employee. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 40 however, provides that the management may allow an employee to leave service earlier on the payment of pay in lieu of notice or a part of the period of the notice, as the case may be. Moreover, sub-rule (2) lays down the consequence where the management does not insist upon the payment of pay in lieu of notice. The consequence is a proportionate amount representing pay in lieu of the notice shall be deducted from the grant that is due to the school concerned. The furnishing of three months’ notice is intended to enable the authorities of the school to make alternative arrangements occasioned upon the resignation of an employee so that the course of education in the school is not disturbed. Indeed that is why sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 provides the consequence of the management allowing an employee to resign from service without the stipulated period of notice or pay in lieu thereof. The only consequence is that the management would lose to a pro-portionate extent, a deduction from the grant which is receivable for the school.

       The plain implication of Rule 40 is that it is for the management to either waive the period of notice by accepting pay in lieu thereof or suffer the consequence of losing a proportionate part of its grant representing the period of notice. In the present case, the school is an unaided school and therefore, even the question of suffering the loss of a proportionate part of the grant need not arise. Be that as it may, it is impossible to subscribe to the view of the Tribunal in finding fault with the management for having accepted the letter of the first respondent with immediate effect. The resignation in the letter dated 6th June, 1989 was submitted with immediate effect and therefore, the action of the management in accepting the letter cannot be faulted. The Tribunal was also of the view that the letter could have been withdrawn within a period of three months. The question of withdrawal may, however, arise where the resignation is furnished with effect from a prospective date. In a case such as the present, where the letter of resignation was with immediate effect and was accepted by the management evidently there was no question of the resignation being withdrawn upon its acceptance.

JUDGMENT - CHANDRACHUD D.J. (Dr.), J.:—The first petitioner claims to be established and administered by a linguistic minority and therefore, to be entitled to the protection of Article 30 of the Constitution. The petitioner conducts several educational institutions including Seth Anandilal Podar High School and Junior College at Santacruz (West), Mumbai. The first respondent joined the aforesaid school in 1981 as an Assistant Teacher in the English Medium. In March 1987, the first respondent was appointed as a Supervisor. On 6th June, 1989, the first respondent addressed a letter to the Director of the Management stating that she was tendering her resignation with a request that she be relieved immediately. The first respondent stated that she was ready to pay compensation in lieu of notice and sought "a good reference". The resignation of the first respondent was accepted by the management on 13th June, 1989, subject however to the payment of three months salary in lieu of the period of notice. On 6th July, 1989, the first respondent addressed a letter to the President of the Greater Bombay Secondary Teachers Association stating that ever since the appointment of the new Principal at the School, the incumbent, Mrs. Marker, had resented the presence of the first respondent. According to the first respondent in the month of April before the school closed for vacation, the Principal did not meet all the members of the staff and the assignments were handed over to the first respondent not by the Principal, but by a clerk. On 5th June, 1989, the first respondent met the Principal on being called for, when the Principal allegedly sought the time table. Upon being presented with the time table, the Principal is stated to have said that the time table would have to be framed again as there were going to be certain changes. According to the first respondent, the Principal had effectively rendered the post of supervisor redundant and in fact, the principal informed her that if she did not like the change, it was open to the first respondent to resign. The first respondent concluded her letter by stating that she was forced to resign and was later asked to pay three months salary in lieu of notice. Subsequently on 20th July, 1989 a complaint was addressed to the management by Greater Bombay Secondary Teachers Association recording that the first respondent had tendered her resignation in a fit anger during the period of vacation not remembering the fact that the resignation could not be tendered during vacation. Over two months after the tendering of her resignation, the first respondent in a letter dated 25th August, 1989 purported to withdraw the resignation stating that she had handed over the resignation across the table to the Director and which had subsequently been accepted by the Principal.

2. The first respondent thereupon moved the School Tribunal at Mumbai in October 1989. The Management filed its written statement denying the allegations in the memo of appeal. The School Tribunal has by the impugned order dated 16th January, 1991 condoned the delay in filing of the appeal, "set aside" the alleged resignation dated 6th June, 1989 and directed the management to reinstate the First respondent in service with full backwages. The order of the School Tribunal came to be stayed when this Petition was admitted on 24th April, 1991 by the Division Bench. Since the matter pertains to the jurisdiction of the Single Judge under the prevailing Rules on the Original Side, the Division Bench directed the office on 14th March, 2002 to place the matter before the appropriate Bench, in pursuance of which the matter has been placed for final hearing before this Court.

3. Several reasons have weighed with the School Tribunal in arriving at its conclusion. The School Tribunal has first and foremost noted the requirement of Section 7 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 which provides thus:

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