JUDGMENT - THAKKER C.K., C.J.:---This appeal is filed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, dated July 11, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 1111 of 1997. By the said order, the learned Single Judge confirmed the order passed by a Member of the Industrial Court, Thane, dated 24th October, 1996 in Complaint (ULP) No. 519 of 1996.

2. Certain facts are not in dispute. On or about June 30, 1992, the appellant Company declared a Voluntary Retirement Scheme ("first VRS" for short) for its employees, which was accepted by 337 employees. On March 16, 1994, the appellant declared second VRS which was in the nature of Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") ("second VRS" for short). That was accepted by 179 employees. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 who had accepted first VRS of 1992 filed a complaint before the Industrial Court, Thane on July 20, 1994, alleging that the company had committed unfair labour practice under Item Nos. 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). It was contended by them that the benefits which were given to employees who had accepted second VRS (MOU of 1994) had not been extended to the complainants who retired in 1992. The said action was illegal, unlawful and amounted to unfair labour practice.

3. The Industrial Court, after considering the evidence on record, oral as well as documentary, upheld the contention, granted the relief prayed by the employees and directed the appellant company to pay an amount of Rs. 90,000/- (Rupees Ninety thousand only) to each employee as had paid to 179 employees who had accepted second VRS in 1994.

4. The order passed by the Industrial Court was challenged by the Appellant Company by filing a petition. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties and considering the contentions raised by the learned Counsel, dismissed the petition and confirmed the order passed by the Industrial Court.

5. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has approached this Court by filing the present Letters Patent Appeal.

6. At the time of admission hearing, a Division Bench of this Court noted that the Counsel on both sides agreed that the decision of the Court on the Letters Patent Appeal would govern the cases of all 337 employees. This was done, submitted the learned Counsel for the respondents, as when a complaint was filed in the Industrial Court, it was only by six employees and all 337 employees were not joined as complainants.

7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. Several contentions were raised on behalf of the company by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It was urged that the complaint was not maintainable since it was not filed by a recognised union as required by the Act. It was also contended that the complainants could not be said to be workmen as defined in section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the ID Act"). It was also submitted that a letter purported to have written by P. Krishnamurthy on 11th July, 1992 was not proved in evidence, and hence could not have been relied upon. On merits, it was contended by the Counsel, that the order passed by the Industrial Court and confirmed by the learned Single Judge was contrary to law and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that after considering the relevant facts and circumstances and evidence on record, the Industrial Court granted relief in favour of the respondents. The learned Single Judge once again considered the decision of the Industrial Court and dismissed the petition by recording cogent, germane and valid reasons. The orders, hence, do not deserve interference by this Court and the Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be dismissed.

9. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, in our opinion, no case has been made out by the appellant so as to interfere with the o

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