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IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Rebello F.I., J.
Registrar, University of Mumbai .... Petitioner.
Versus
Lata Bhor another.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 2327 of 2004, decided on 10-9-2004.
Advocates appeared :
P.M. Palshikar, for petitioner.
U.D. Bhat, for respondents.
Held, that once that be the case the services of the respondent No. 1 stood terminated in terms of the letter of 13th September, 1995. Clearly therefore, there was a termination within the meaning of Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, the Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The petition is allowed on the ground of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Industrial Court to entertain the complaint. No objection was raised by the petitioners herein to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the complaint. In these circumstances on behalf of the University their Counsel made a statement that if a petition is filed by the respondent within six weeks, then the University will not raise the ground of limitation and that the Tribunal considering the power under Section 59(2) can proceed to condone the delay and hear the Appeal as filed. If the appeal is preferred within six weeks then the Tribunal considering that the respondent has been pursuing the matter from 1996 to dispose of the complaint within 3 months from the date of filing of the Appeal.
Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 - Section 59 - Termination of service - Service of employee terminated in terms of letter of appointment - Purely temporary appointment for a period not exceeding 6 months - Termination within meaning of Section 59 of Act - Industries Court has no jurisdiction to entertain complaint under MRTU and PULP Act. - In the first instance the respondent was given a letter of appointment on 23rd February, 1995. In that letter it was set out that the respondent would be considered for temporary appointment for a period not exceeding six months in the first instance and which was likely to be continued till selection subsequently. The petitioner did join services. Thereafter a fresh letter of appointment was issued on 13th September, 1995 that the petitioner was appointed purely on temporary basis for a period not exceeding six months with immediate effect. In other words the language was clear that the appointment was purely temporary and for a period not exceeding six months. There is also a clause that the services could be terminated before the expiry of six months without assigning any reason. Before the period of six months could expire the respondent filed a complaint under MRTU and PULP Act being Complaint No. 169 of 1996. On 3rd April 1996, interim relief was granted and was continued upto 19th June, 1996 on which date the complaint filed was withdrawn to file a complaint before the Industrial Court. However, interim relief was continued till 24th June, 1996. The complaint before the Industrial Court was filed on 25th June, 1996. It is thus clear that it was the understanding of the respondent herself that the services will stand terminated with effect from 3rd April, 1996 in terms of letter of appointment dated 13th September, 1995 as can be seen from her application dated 1st July, 1996 moved before the Industrial Court for interim relief. The respondent herself understood that her services would be terminated with effect from 3rd April, 1996. The respondent’s services were thereafter continued pursuant to the interim order of the Labour Court. Continuation of service pursuant to interim order of Court does not confer any legal right on the employee as the continuation is purely pursuant to direction by the Labour Court. It could have been understood if the complaint had been filed on 24th June, 1996 itself in which case it may have still been possible to consider that as the complaint was filed based on apprehension of threatened termination the Industrial Court had jurisdiction. However, the complaint was filed on 25th June, 1996. The stay expired on 24th June, 1996. Once that be the case the services of the respondent No. 1 stood terminated in terms of the letter of 13th September, 1995. Clearly, therefore, there was a termination with the meaning of Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act. The Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The contention as raised on behalf of the University will have to be accepted and the petition will have to be allowed on the ground of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Industrial Court to entertain the complaint.
2. The petitioner University by the present action seeks to impugn the order of the Industrial Court dated September 6, 2002 partly allowing the complaint and holding that the petitioners herein are guilty of Unfair Labour Practice under Items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act and further directing the petitioners herein to issue fresh appointment letter to the complainant with continuity of service after expiry of six months period of service.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that considering section 59 of the Maharashtra University Act, 1994 the Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction as in the case of termination it is the Tribunal constituted under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 which alone would have jurisdiction in cases where the services of a teacher or other employee is dismissed or removed or his services are otherwise terminated or reduced in rank. It is pointed out that the respondent was appointed by letter dated 13th September, 1995 on purely temporary basis as junior typist-cum-clerk in the examination section for a period not exceeding six months. It is pointed out that therefore by efflux of time in the normal course on expiry of said period of six months the services of the petitioner herein would come to an end. It is pointed out that the respondent herein filed a complaint before the Labour Court being U.L.P. No. 169 of 1996 anticipating that the services will be terminated after 3rd April, 1996. The Labour Court was pleased to grant interim relief. Thereafter the complaint was withdrawn. The Labour Court extended the stay upto 24th June, 1996. The complaint before the Industrial Court was filed on 25th June, 1996. In other words it is pointed out that as on 25th June, 1996 the respondent was no longer in service and consequently the Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
2. On the other hand on behalf of the respondents their learned Counsel contends that the petition has been filed belatedly i.e. nearly after two years of the order of the Industrial Court and that too, only after the respondent herein had taken proceedings by way of execution. It is further submitted that when the petition was filed before the Labour Court the petitioner was in service and the termination had not yet been taken place. In these circumstances the Labour Court had jurisdiction. Apart from that it is contended that the complaint before the Industrial Court was filed on 25th June, 1996. The Industrial Court has recorded a finding that there has been no termination and in these circumstances the Industrial Court would have jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the complaint. It is further pointed out that another learned Judge of this Court in the case of (Satyawadi Ganpatrao Pimple others v. Aruna Ganpatrao Narwade another)1, 2000(3) Bom.C.R. (A.B.)182, dealing with the matter under the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act has taken a view in so far as non-teaching staff is concerned that remedy of filing civil suit under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is impliedly barred. At the outset it may be pointed out that on a careful perusal of the judgment and the ratio therein it will be clear that what was in issue before the learned Judge was whether the Civil Court and the Tribunal under the M.E.P.S. Act had concurrent jurisdiction. Any other passing observations made therein while answering the said issue cannot constitute to be ratio of that judgment.
3. With the above, we may consider the contention as now urged. It is no doubt true that there is delay on the part of the petitioner in moving this Court. The question, however, is whether on that count the petition ought to be dismissed. In the instant case the issue is whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction. Proceedings in execution are pending. The petitioners
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