V.A. Mohta, J.- This is a reference arising out of difference of opinion between two learned Single Judges of this Coon upon the following question :

Whether the application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code independency or read with Article 227 or independently under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable at the instance of the party who has availed the remedy of revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code?

We record the answer in the affirmative for the reasons that follow.

2. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (the Code) confers co-extensive and concurrent revisional powers upon the High Court or any Sessions Judge. A glance at the aforesaid provision will indicate that the revisional powers (i) can be exercised even suo motu (ii) cannot be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order and (iii) cannot be pressed into service second time in the other Court at the behest of the same party in respect of the same subject matter. Section 482 of the Code saves the inherent powers of High Court and reads thus:

"Saving of inherent powers of High Court.

482. I Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

Going by the plain language and the non obstante clause employed in Section 482, first impression is inevitable that this provision has the effect of superseding and excluding all the other provisions as a result High Court's inherent jurisdiction is all pervading and can be exercised in regard to any matter to secure ends of justice. But it is not so. Law is crystallized by judicial precedents that this extra-ordinary power cannot be exercised in matters for which there is an express provision or express bar in the Code.

3. The leading decision on the subject is the case Madhu Liamye v. State of Maharashtra1 which has been followed in several later decisions by the Supreme Court. The following principles in relation to the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court are settled therein-

i. That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

ii. That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

iii. That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

4. In the case of Raj Kapoor and Others v. State (Delhi Administration) and Others2, it is held:

"The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 stands repelled when' the revisional power under section 397 over laps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law; when if specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code."

5. In the case of V.C. Shukla v. State3 , with reference to Section 397(3) of the Code, it is held: "Sub-section (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in Section 482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions judge under Section 397(1) of the Code. We need not dilate on this aspect because we are not called upon to consider the interpretation of Section 397(1) of the Code although in one of the cases cited before us this aspect has been gone into."

6. Following observation in the case o