R.M. LODHA, J. :- The Division Bench requested the Chief Justice to constitute larger Bench to decide the following issue:

"Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply or not in case of an appeal filed under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961?"

2. Accordingly, the present Full Bench has been constituted by the Chief Justice.

3. In our view, the question needs to be reframed. The question is :

"Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply in case of an appeal filed under section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961?"

4. This is how the aforesaid question arises. The revenue challenged the order dated 3 January, 2006 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench by filing an appeal under section 260-A of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. Since the appeal suffered from delay of 11 days, an application was made by revenue for the condonation of delay. The assessee raised the objection that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the revenue as it is excluded by necessary implication.

5. Mr. S. K. Kakodkar, Senior Counsel for the assessee forcefully submitted, that he always does, that the Income Tax Act, 1961 is a complete code in itself; it provides for all aspects relating to levy and recovery of income-tax, the procedure there for, remedies including appeals and revisions and penalties and prosecution. Section 260-A that provides for an appeal to the High Court on substantial questions of law is exhaustive in all respects including the period of limitation and the said provision also being a complete code in itself relating to the remedy of appeal to the High Court, the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by necessary implication. The submission of the Senior Counsel is that section 260-A clearly provides in compulsive form that appeal shall be filed before the High Court within 120 days and the longer limitation having already been provided, the legislature impliedly excluded the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. According to him, resort to the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act in the appeal preferred under section 260-A is impermissible. Mr. S. K. Kakodkar would submit that the collection of revenue cannot brook delay and, therefore, the legislature by providing the different period of limitation which is longer than the period of limitation provided in Article 116 of the Limitation Act, clearly indicates its intention in excluding section 5 by necessary implication. His submission is that there is no equity in the tax laws nor the law of limitation. In support of his submission that the Income Tax Act, 1961 is self contained Code and exhaustive of the matters dealt therein, Mr. S. K. Kakodkar, the Senior Counsel heavily relied upon the two judgments of the Supreme Court; (i) Ravulu Subba Rao and others vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1956 SC 604, and (ii) Sales Tax Officer, Banaras and others vs. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf, AIR 1959 SC 135. The Senior Counsel also relied upon: (i) Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. vs. Custodian, (2004) 11 SCC 472, (ii) L. S. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2004)11 SCC 456, (iii) Gopal Sardar vs. Karuna Sardar, (2004) 4 SCC 252, (iv) Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co., (2001)8 SCC 470, (v) Commissioner of C. Ex., Meerut-II vs. Salora International, 2006(206) E.L T. 61 for the proposition that section 29(2) or for that section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by necessary implication.

6. Mr. S. R. Rivonkar, the Counsel for the revenue, on the other hand, submitted that Income Tax Act, 1961 is a consolidated and amending Act and the provisions of section 260-A are not the complete code in itself. By virtue of subsection (7) of section 260-A that provides that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals are made applicable to appeals under section 260-A, the Counsel for the revenue would submit that section 260-A is not c