The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a final decision on the application of Section 219 of the Cr.P.C. to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

P. SATHASIVAM, J.:-The Order of reference made by T. V. Masilamani, J. reads as under:

"Crl.O.P No.21432 of 2002:

This Petition is filed to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.1130 of 2002 on the file of the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai.

2. The averments in the Petition are stated briefly as follows:

The petitioner is the resident of Aim in Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh. She started business in consumer items and placed orders for supply of several consumer items with the respondent Company having its office at Mumbai. The respondent supplied goods on various dates from 21.7.2001 to 30.8.2001. The petitioner signed blank cheques and left with the respondent and as per the usual trade practice, the respondent filled up the amount for the values supplied in the cheque and received payment through bank. On account of the ill-health of the petitioner, she entrusted the business to her brothers and since they mismanaged the same, the business was closed down in or about September, 2000. In the meantime, the respondent presented the cheques for realisation at Mumbai and they were returned by the payee bank as dishonoured. Since the petitioner had no means to pay the entire amount, she filed the Insolvency Petition in I.P No.40 of 2001 before the District Court, Kurnool. In the meanwhile, the respondent presented all the cheques to the collecting bank again at Chennai on 31.10.2001 and they were returned as dishonoured. Thereupon the respondent issued notice on 22.11.2001 which was received by the petitioner on 26.11.2001 to which she had also sent a reply on 7.12.2001 stating that the Petition for adjudicating her as an insolvent was pending. Ultimately, the insolvency Petition on I.P No.40 of 2001 was allowed on 18.4.2002. The respondent filed the Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in C.C. No.1130 of 2002 before the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai having territorial jurisdiction. Since the petitioner is a permanent resident of a place in Andhra Pradesh, she finds it inconvenient to defend the Petition pending before the said Court at Chennai and therefore, the said proceedings is liable to be quashed. Hence, the Petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued at the outset that the cheques mentioned in the Complaint filed by the respondent are covered by the invoices against the specific purchase orders and therefore all of them represent distinct causes of action. Similarly, he has argued that since more than three offences of the same kind within a year cannot be clubbed together, the Petition is violative of Section 219, Cr.P.C. and therefore, he has urged that on that ground alone, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. Further, he has argued that the complainant had deliberately presented the cheques at Chennai to harass the petitioner even though they were originally presented for collection through the respondent's bank at Mumbai and therefore, in view of her inconvenience as she is residing far away from Chennai to stand trial in the above said proceedings, the Petition has to be allowed. The respondent's counsel has submitted his argument with rEference to the points raised by the petitioner's counsel as mentioned above.

4. On the side of the petitioner, the learned counsel has cited the decision rendered by M. Karpagavinayagam, J. in M/s. Printo Stick Vs. M. L. Oswal, 1997 Cri.L.J. 2122, in support of his contention that in view of Section 219, Cr.P.C. more than three cheques could not be clubbed together to file the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (called Act 26 of 1881) and that in this case since the respondent filed the complaint on the basis of 16 cheques, it is violative of the mandatory provision referred to above. Hence he has urged that the petition has to be allowed quashing the said proceedings.

5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the

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