2007 Supreme(Bom) 891
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.
Smt. Laxmibai Laxman Medhi and others –Petitioners.
V/s.
Shri Kesarimal Premchand Parmar since deceased through his legal heirs Tijabai Kesarimal Parmar and other -Respondents
Civil application no. 415 of 2006
In writ petition no.530 of 1985
Decided on:5th July, 2007
Advocates appeared:
Mr. Sachin Punde i/by Mr. Rajiv Patil for the petitioners.
Mr. B.I. Dalvi for the respondents.
Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXIII, Rule 3 - Constitution of India, Article 227 - Recalling of judgment and order. - Though the petition under Article 227 was disposed of on consent terms even then application to recall judgment and order and to hear matter on merits is maintainable.
2. The petitioners would rely on section 53 and section 56 of the Indian Contract Act to buttress the argument that on account of the changed situation, the contract terms agreed upon by the petitioners, as recorded in the consent terms, have become voidable, if not void. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another AIR 1993 SC 1139 to support the argument that the remedy of recall is permissible and indubitably one of the available remedies provided under the principles analogous to the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code.
3. The respondents have filed detailed affidavit opposing the stand taken by the petitioners. The counsel for the respondents has raised preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the application. According to the respondents, the application should be dismissed as the petitioners have not approached this court with clean hands. Besides, the present application is not maintainable being barred by principles of res judicata. According to the respondents, merely because of the clause provided under the consent terms of granting liberty to the parties to mention the matter, that cannot be the basis to entertain the application in the absence of any authority in the court to do so. The respondents have also stated in reply affidavit that the consent terms arrived at between the parties were lawfully entered into and accepted by the court. In such a case, the court has no jurisdiction to review the proceedings even though there are subsequent developments, as is alleged by the petitioners. This is the sum and substance of the objection taken on behalf of the respondents as preliminary contention. In so far as merits is concerned, the respondents on affidavit have asserted that inspite of the consent terms entered into by the parties as back as on 19th July, 2002, the petitioners did not take any steps to discharge their obligation of construction of the premises to be allotted to the respondents as alternate accommodation in lieu of the tenanted premises. In fact, the petitioners merely applied for permission only of repair and reconstruction and not for construction of new structure to accommodate the respondents. This stand is taken on the basis of the application which was submitted by the petitioners to the Municipal authority on 23rd May, 2003, as appended to the reply affidavit as Exhibit `1`. Respondents would assert that the petitioners have intentionally not placed this document on record and have suppressed the same from the court.