2008(2) Bom.C.R. 853
(O.S.)
Rebello F,I. & Devadhar J.P., JJ.
Narang Overseas Put. Ltd. ... Petitioners.
Versus
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & ors. ... Respondents.
Writ Petition Lodg. No. 1454 of 2007.
Decided on 30-7-2007.
Income Tax Act - Interpretation of section 254(2-A) - [Finance Act, 2007, section 254(2-A)] - The court discussed the provisions of section 254(2-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and its amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2007. The court analyzed the effect of the third proviso on the Tribunal's power to grant interim reliefs and interpreted the legislative intent behind the amendments. The court highlighted the principles of statutory interpretation and the duty of the Tribunal to dispose of appeals within specified time frames.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered the question of whether the third proviso to section 254(2-A) of the Income Tax Act denuded the Tribunal of its incidental power to grant interim reliefs. The petitioner argued that the Tribunal's order, which denied the incidental power, was erroneous and should be set aside. The respondents contended that the Tribunal's view was consistent with legislative intent and should not be interfered with.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Tribunal's refusal to entertain further extension of interim relief, despite the delay in appeal disposal not being the fault of the assessee, was unjust. The court emphasized the principles of statutory interpretation and the duty of the Tribunal to dispose of appeals within specified time frames.
Issues: The issues revolved around the interpretation of the third proviso to section 254(2-A) of the Income Tax Act and its impact on the Tribunal's power to grant interim reliefs. The court also considered the legislative intent behind the amendments and the duty of the Tribunal to dispose of appeals within specified time frames.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the Tribunal retains the power to continue interim relief, even if the delay in appeal disposal is not attributable to the assessee. The court emphasized that the power to grant interim relief is inherent and not defeated by the provisos to the sub-section. The court also highlighted the duty of the Tribunal to extend the period of stay on good cause being shown and on being satisfied that the delay was not attributable to the assessee.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition, set aside the impugned order, and directed the Tribunal to continue the interim relief for a further period of four months. The Tribunal was instructed to dispose of the appeal within the said period, and no costs were awarded in the circumstances of the case.
REBELLO F.I., J.: - Rule. Considering the importance of the question heard forthwith. The question: "Does the third proviso to section 254(2-A) of Income Tax Act, have the effect of denuding the Tribunal of its incidental power to grant interim reliefs?
2. Finance Act, 2007 substituted subsection (2-A) to section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 with effect from 1st June, 2007. The said sub-section as amended reads as under:-
"(2A) In every appeal, the Appellate Tribunal, where it is possible, may hear and decide such appeal within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) of section 253:
Provided that the appellate Tribunal may, after considering the merits of the application made by the assessee, pass an order of stay in any proceedings relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of section 253, for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order and the appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the said period of stay specified in that order.
Provided further that where such appeal is not so disposed of within the said period of stay as specified in the order of stay, the appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf by the assessee and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, extend the period of stay, or pass an order of stay for a further period or periods as it thinks fit; so, however, that the aggregate of the period originally allowed and the period or periods so extended or allowed shall not, in any case, exceed three hundred and sixty days and the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the period or periods of stay so extended or allowed.
Provided also that if such appeal is not so disposed of within the period allowed under the first proviso or the period or periods extended or allowed under the second proviso, the order of stay shall stand vacated after the expiry of such period or periods."
2-A. The submissions of the petitioner before us are as under:
That inspite of the third proviso as introduced by the Finance Act, 2007, the incidental power of the Tribunal to grant interim relief during the pendency of the proceedings subsists. The impugned order of the Tribunal which has taken a contrary view suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record and consequently is liable to be set aside. A literal construction which gives rise to absurd result should be avoided as it would occasion tremendous hardship to an assessee for no fault of such assessee. It is further submitted and as raised by way of a ground in the petition, that if an interpretation is given which would render a provision unconstitutional and another interpretation is possible which avoids unconstitionality, the view which would avoid the provision being held unconstitutional should be accepted. The Tribunal it is submitted also erred in holding that to interpret the new provisions as prospective would de- , feat their existence or render them ineffective or inoperative and the Tribunal also erred in recording a finding that the interpretation , given by it on the proviso was harmonious. The Supreme Court it is submitted has considered similar provisions under the Central Excise Act and Salt Act, 1944 and has held that the Tribunal does not cease to have powers to continue the interim relief.
3. On the other hand on behalf of the respondents, their learned Counsel submits that it cannot be said that the view taken 1 by the Tribunal is contrary to any principle of legislative interpretation. What the Tribunal has done is to give effect to the mandate of the legislation and the intent of the Parliament which is clear from the language of the proviso and in these circumstances it is submitted that this Court ought not to interfere in the exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction.
4. The facts herein are not in dispute
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