The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a liberal approach in condoning delay, particularly in cases involving government or public bodies. The court emphasized the special circumstances that may apply to the government and the importance of considering public interest and the functioning of the government in assessing 'sufficient cause' for delay.

1. Rule. By consent, Rule is made returnable forthwith.

2. Heard Counsel for the parties.

3. This revision application is directed against the decision of the District Judge, Dhule rendered on 2nd July 2004 allowing Misc. Civil Application No. 82 of 1998 filed by the respondent for condonation of delay in filing of an appeal.

4. The appellant filed a suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 178 of 1987 against the respondent Municipal Council for perpetual injunction restraining it from demolishing the business premises of the applicant. The suit was filed on account of a notice issued by the respondent Municipal Council to the applicant for removal of a structure allegedly erected by him unauthorisedly on a public road belonging to the Municipal Council. By a judgment and order dated 6th May, 1995, trial Court decreed the suit and granted injunction restraining the respondent Municipal Council from demolishing the illegal structure unless suitable alternative business premises were made available to the applicant by the respondent Municipal Council. The respondent did not file an appeal against the decision within the statutory period of limitation but an appeal was filed nearly after three years along with an application for condonation of delay. In the application for condonation of delay, the respondent gave following reasons which constituted sufficient cause for the delay. They are –

I. The President and four Chief Officers were transferred during the period till 6-5-1995 till date of the filing of the appeal. President of the Municipal Council was also changed. Many other officers were also transferred or changed because of many changes which occurred in the administrative set up of the Municipal Council, administrative delays were caused resulting into delay of the filing of the appeal.

II. The respondent was a local body and one Mr. C. P. Gilani was the President of the Municipal Council from 17-12-1991 to 21-1-1996. He was belonging to Sindh community and he was leader of Sindhi community. Several traders of Sindhi community had committed a large scale encroachment on the jail road and had erected illegal structures on the public road. C. P. Gilani and/or his son was also one of such encroachers and was running liquor shop in the encroached portion. All the shop keepers had filed similar suits and had obtained injunction. He was, therefore, interested in ensuing that no appeal was filed challenging the decision of the Civil Court. He undoubtedly influenced the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council who was working under the President not to file the appeals. Therefore, the appeal couldnot be filed while Mr. Gilani was the President.

III. New elections to the Municipal Council were held on 2-12-1996. There was a litigation regarding the seat of the President and the litigation was pending before the High Court for suitable period of time and a new President was elected very recently.

IV. The Advocate for the Municipal Council was seriously ill for many months and, therefore, he shifted for practice to Aurangabad in the High Court and a new Advocate was appointed. This also caused the delay in filing the appeal. The evidence on the application was adduced in the form of affidavits and no oral evidence was adduced. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned District Judge, Dhule came to a conclusion that the delay was satisfactorily explained and there was sufficient cause for the delay caused in filing of the appeal. Consequently, the learned District Judge allowed the application and condoned the delay. Aggrieved applicant has filed the revision application.

5. Learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that the grounds mentioned above do not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He submitted that the delay was gross, of nearly three years and, therefore, it ought not to have been condoned. He submitted that the Court cannot and should not make any