2009 ALL MR (Cri) 3723
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY (PANAJI BENCH)
N. A. BRITTO, J.
Shri. Ramdas P. Naik -Appellant
Versus.
Shri. P. Kumaran Respondent
Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2008
Decided on : 13th August, 2009.
In the first round, the accused was convicted by Order dated 4-10- 2000. The accused having appealed from the said Order, the learned Sessions Judge was pleased to remand the case with a direction to record additional 313 statement of the accused in respect of additional evidence recorded. The learned Magistrate recorded the evidence of the accused as well. In the second round, the accused came to be acquitted by Order dated 30-9-2006. The accused has been acquitted by the impugned Order on three counts, namely, (1) that the statutory demand notice was defective; (2) the Court had no territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the complainant had failed to prove that there was a debt or liability. As per the complainant, the sum of Rs.3,50,000/was advanced against a hundi executed by the accused but the learned Magistrate accepted the version of the accused in relation to the said hundi according to which the said hundi was given by the accused to gain some time for Shri. K. Abdulla for whom the complainant was working, and who had threatened the accused that he would be dragged to the Court.
2. After completion of arguments on the said three points, Shri. Lotlikar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has raised a point of limitation contending that the complaint was time barred, the same not having been filed as required by Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. As per the complainant, the statutory notice of demand was hand delivered to the accused on 23-4-1995, and both the learned Counsel agree that 24-3-1995 has got to be excluded. Clause (b) of Section 142 provides that cognizance of an offence can be taken upon a complaint which is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused had fifteen days to make the payment in terms of the said proviso from the date of the said notice which ended on 8th April, 1998. In other words, the accused had seven days of March and eight days of April to comply with the said notice and the failure to pay in accordance with the said notice gave a cause of action to the complainant to file the complaint which started on 9th April, 1995. The accused had twenty two days of April and eight days of May i.e. thirty days before which the complaint ought to have been filed. In other words, the last date of filing the complaint was 8th May, 1995 but the complaint was presented or filed on 9th May, 1995. The complaint having been filed with one day of delay, the same ought to have been dismissed as time barred, not complying with the provision of Section 142(b) of the said Act.
3. In the above view of the matter, it is not necessary to deal with the merits of the appeal. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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