Bombay High Court
JAHAGIRDAR,MODY
Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil - Appellant
Versus
P.Y.Deshpande, Special Land Acquisition Officer - Respondent
Decided On : 08/28/1981
LAND ACQUISITION ACT - SECTION 18(3) - LIMITATION ACT - APPLICABILITY - COLLECTOR NOT A COURT - REVISION APPLICATION - MAHARASHTRA AMENDMENT - INTERPRETATION.
Fact of the Case:
In land acquisition proceedings, petitioners filed applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Court instead of the Collector within the prescribed six-week period. They later withdrew the applications and filed them with the Collector after the six-week period, along with applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. The Collector refused to condone the delay, leading to revision applications challenging his decision.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the Collector exercising functions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, even after the Maharashtra amendment, is not a Court to which the provisions of the Limitation Act apply. The Maharashtra amendment, which subjects the Collector's orders to revision by the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, does not convert the Collector into a Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code for all purposes.
Issues: 1. Whether the Collector exercising functions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is a Court to which the provisions of the Limitation Act apply. 2. Whether the Maharashtra amendment to Section 18, which subjects the Collector's orders to revision by the High Court, converts the Collector into a Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code for all purposes.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Limitation Act applies only to applications made to Courts, as defined under the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The Collector, while discharging functions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, is a statutory authority with restricted powers and not a Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code. 3. The Maharashtra amendment to Section 18 merely provides for revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over the Collector's orders and does not convert the Collector into a Court governed by the Civil Procedure Code for all purposes.
Final Decision: The Court overruled the decision in Ramesh Wankhede's case, which held that the Collector is a Court under Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to applications for reference under Section 18. The Court dismissed the revision applications, holding that the Collector is not a Court to which the provisions of the Limitation Act apply.
JAHAGIRDAR, J.:- These three revision applications have been referred to this Division Bench by the learned Chief Justice on a recommendation made by Shah J. in a judgment of 5th Jan. 1981. Shah J. thought it necessary to refer these petitions to a Division Bench because he disagreed with the view taken by another single Judge of this Court in Ramesh Shankar Wankhede v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 Bom.297. The question involved is one relating to the interpretation of sub-sec.(3) of S.18 Land Acquisition Act. This sub-section has been introduced by the Maharashtra legislature by Act 38 of 1964. More particularly the question is whether the Collector exercising his function under S.18 Land Acquisition Act and passing an order on an application made under S.18 is a court to which the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, apply.
2. Before we consider the relevant provisions and the authorities cited for throwing light on the question, a few facts must be mentioned. In the land acquisition proceedings giving rise to these revision applications, notification under S.4 Land Acquisition Act had been issued on 20th of Feb. 1970. Thereafter the award was passed on 15th Feb. 1978. Subsequent dates are somewhat different in the three applications, but it may be stated that the applications under S.18 were made by all the petitioners in these revision applications to the District Court within a period of six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2), Land Acquisition Act. The applications were not made to the Collector as required under S.18 of the Act. Realising that the applications were made to the wrong authority, the parties withdrew the said applications from the District Court and thereafter presented them to the Collector. By the time this was done, the period of six weeks prescribed under S.18(2)(b) of the Act had expired.
3. Along with the applications which they had thus preferred to this Collector, the petitioners had also made applications purporting to be applications under S.5 Limitation Act for condoning the delay in preferring the applications to the Collector. In all these three cases, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, acting as the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act refused to condone the delay because, according to him, he could not entertain any applications which were preferred after a period of six weeks prescribed under S.18(b) of the Act. Aggrieved by this order passed by the Collector, the petitioners have preferred these three revision applications. They were heard by Shah J. who by his detailed judgment of 5th Jan. 1981, disagreed with the view taken by a single Judge of this Court in Ramesh Wankhede's case (AIR 1975 Bom 297) and recommended that the petitions be placed before a Division Bench.
4. Before we notice the view taken by the learned single Judge in Ramesh Wankhede's case, it will be appropriate to briefly take note to the law laid down by the Supreme Court relating to the applicability of the Limitation Act to authorities other than the Courts and also the scope and ambit of the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In Athani municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335, a question had arisen as to whether an application made under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was an application within the meaning of Art.137 Limitation Act 1963 and if it were so it could be filed within three years from the accrual of the cause of action. Two propositions were laid down by the Supreme Court in that judgment. One was that the application envisaged under Art.137 of the Limitation Act must be an application under the Civil P.C. and secondly that application must be made to a Court governed by the Civil or Criminal P.C. Since the application under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not satisfy either of these two conditions, it was held that the Limitation Act. 1963 was not applicable and, therefore, Art.137
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