2010 Supreme(Bom) 764
2010(4) ALL MR 586
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ANOOP V. MOHTA, J.
Shri. Shriprakash Chandmal Bora & Anr.
Vs.
Shri. Mutyal Vilas Rambau
Writ Petition No. 1772 of 2010 11th June, 2010.
Subject
Contempt of Court - Jurisdiction of School Tribunal
Act Referred
Headnote
B) Criminal P.C. (1973), Chap.21 Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act (1977), S.13:- Just because they are in pari material, the power under Cr.P.C. Chapter 21 cannot be invoked without permission and authorization.
Mr. D. S. MHAISPURKAR, for the Petitioners.
Mr. SUBHASH LANGOTE with Mr. V. A. MADANE, for the Respondent.
2. The Petitioners have challenged the impugned orders passed under Section 13 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Services) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short, M.E.P.S. Act), by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal directing the Respondents to appear for framing charges and thereby rejected their application for discharge at Exhibit No.1, by referring to Section 10(2) of M.E.P.S. Act and further by invoking Chapter 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.) & thereby issued notices for punishment under Section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act for non-compliance of Tribunal order in question.
3. The School Tribunal unless authorized and/or empowered and/or allocated the additional work of Judicial Magistrate, First Class (for short, J.M.F.C.) and/or allocated specific work in addition to the existing work of School Tribunal, the work of J.M.F.C., may not invoke Section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act, as done in the present case.
4. The Respondent's Appeal was allowed by order dated 07/08/2009 and the termination order was set aside. On 14/09/2009, through Miscellaneous Application 5/2009, under Section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act as pointed out that the Petitioners failed to implement the orders, by order dated 23/02/2010 the tribunal found guilty for contempt and therefore, decided to record the plea of the Petitioners. There is nothing pointed out that the learned Presiding Officer has been provided/empowered to work as a J.M.F.C. and as there is nothing on record to show such work was allocated to him specifically the present case. The power of Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal, cannot be equated with the power of the J.M.F.C. unless notified accordingly.
5. Section 13 of the M.E.P.S. Act, which reproduced as under, is very clear.
"13.(1) If the Management fails, without any reasonable excuse to comply with any direction issued by the Tribunal [under section 11 of any order issued by the Director under clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) of section 4-A within the period specified in such direction or as the case may be under sub-section (5) of Section 4-A or within such further period as may be allowed by the Tribunal or Director as the case may be], the Management shall on conviction be punished,-
(a) for the first offence, [with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fifteen days or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both] :
Provided that, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, the fine shall not be less than [ten thousand rupees]; and
(b) for the second and subsequent offences, [with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fifteen days or with fine which may extent to seventy-five thousand rupees, or with both];
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, the fine shall not be less than [twenty thousand rupees].
(2)(a) Where the Management committing an offence under this section is a society, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the society, for the conduct of the affairs to the society, as well as the society, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :
Provided that, nothing contained in this subsection shall render any person liable to the punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.
(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) where the offence has been committed by a society and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any President, Chairman, Secretary, Member, Head or Manager or other Officer or Servant of the