The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Labour Court has the power to award interest under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and that interest is payable under the Interest Act 1978.

1. The Petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari to quash and set aside the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court dismissing his application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the ID Act").

2. The case, in a nutshell, is this. In the Petitioner's deceased husband's earlier application also under Section 33-C(2), the Respondent was, by an order dated 30th September, 1992, directed to pay him a sum of Rs.65,781/-. The Respondent paid the same almost eleven years later, on 14th March, 2003, after dragging the Petitioner through rounds of tortuous litigation and only after this Court issued notice in a Contempt Petition filed by the Petitioner. The Petitioner filed the present application under Section 33-C(2) for interest at 12 per cent per annum for the period 30th September, 1992 to 14th March, 2003.

3. Mr.Patil, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent opposed the Petitioner's application for interest on the following grounds :-

i). The application under Section 33-C(2) was filed after considerable delay.

ii). The application is not maintainable as there was no employer employee relationship between the parties at the relevant time.

iii). The Petitioner failed to furnish any evidence in support of the application.

iv). The application is barred by res-judicata and/or principles analogous thereto.

v). There is no legal basis for the grant of interest. I have answered each of the submissions in the negative, against the Respondent.

4. Mr.Patil's fifth defence raises a question of law of some importance. The question of law that arises is whether the Labour Court has power under Section 33-C(2) to order an employer to pay the employee interest for the period between the date of an order of a Court or Tribunal or authority for payment and the date of payment. I have answered the question in the affirmative upholding the claim for interest in such cases on four grounds - under Sections 3(1) (a) and (b) and 4 of the Interest Act, 1978, and in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A view to the contrary would lead to a total miscarriage of justice and disastrous consequences not merely in this matter but for bona-fide and innocent employees in general. It would put a premium on an employer disregarding orders of Courts, Tribunals and other authorities. Worse still, it would encourage an employer to refuse payments under such orders for as long as possible, rendering them virtually meaningless. 5(a). The Petitioner's deceased husband had filed an application also under Section 33-C(2) in the year 1989 claiming, inter alia, over-time wages. The claim was upheld and the Respondent was directed to compute and pay the same within three months from the date of the order i.e. by 30th December, 1992. The Petitioner requested the Respondent to pay the amounts pursuant to the said order dated 30th September, 1992, orally, as well as in writing. It is not necessary to set out the details of these requests. Suffice it to state that they were not complied with.

(b). The Respondent challenged the order after six years by filing Writ Petition No.1955 of 1998. The Writ Petition was rejected by an order of this court dated 10th February, 2000.

(c) About two years later, the Respondent filed Appeal No.311 of 2002 against the said order. The appeal was dismissed by an order of the Division Bench dated 23rd April, 2002.

(d). Even thereafter the Respondent refused to comply with the order dated 30th September, 1992. The Petitioner was, therefore, constrained to file a Contempt Petition. The same was served on the Respondent. This court issued notice to the Respondent on the Contempt Petition. It is only thereafter that the Respondent paid an amount of Rs.65,781/- on 14th March, 2003 as per the said order dated 30th September, 1992. The amount was, therefore, paid after a delay of almost eleven years.

(e). The Petitioner, the