Judgement

DUA, J.:- Facts necessary for understanding the short but important point arising for decision in this appeal by special leave are these :

The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office in New Delhi. Its entire share capital has been subscribed by the Central Government. Pritam Singh Gill, respondent No. 1, in this appeal was employed by the appellant as Junior Engineer at its Bhopal office with effect from the 9th November, 1962 at Rs. 280/- p.m. as basic salary with other allowances. On October 5, 1964 he was suspended and this order of suspension remained in force till September 18, 1967. He was dismissed from service on September 19, 1967. During the period of suspension on October 7, 1965, the respondent was transferred to Delhi. On June 15, 1968 the respondent applied to the Labour Court at Delhi under Sec. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) for computing the benefits and amounts he was entitled to receive alleging that the appellant had not paid to him such amount and benefits. The appellant contested the respondent s claim on various grounds. The Labour Court framed the following four issues:

"1. Whether the application is not legally maintainable?

2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition?

3. Whether the petitioner has been dismissed with effect from 19-9-1967, if so its effect?

4. Whether the applicant is entitled to any of the benefits claimed?" and decided all of them in favour of the respondent who was held entitled to Rs. 5,195/- as balance of salary at the rate of Rs. 150/- p.m. for the period of suspension and also other allowances, that total amount computed being Rs. 10,259,98.

2. Before us the appellant only questioned the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the respondent s application under S. 33C (2) of the Act because, according to the submission, the respondent, having already been dismissed has ceased to be a workman on the date of the application. After his dismissal, argued Shri Malhotra learned counsel for the appellant, the respondent ceased to be a workman and had, therefore, no locus standi to approach the Labour Court under S. 33C (2) and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondent s application. The date of the application under S. 33C (2) of the Act, contended the counsel, is the crucial point of time, when it is to be seen whether or not the applicant is a workman. The respondent on the other hand emphasised that if the period, in respect of which the benefits and amount are claimed under S. 33C (2) of the Act was during the course of his employment prior to his dismissal, then, the mere fact, that he was dismissed by his employer before he could apply to the Labour Court under S. 33C (2), would not deprive him of his right to claim relief under that section. The sole question we are thus called upon to decide is, whether Section 33C (2) can be invoked by a dismissed workman in respect of benefits and salary due to him for the period prior to the date of his dismissal. It may be stated that the appellant did not contend that a workman under suspension is disentitled to seek relief under S. 33C (2) and indeed, it was specifically conceded that a suspended workman could invoke this section for relief because by suspension he does not cease to be a workman as defined in the Act. The question posed is a pure question of law depending on the construction of the relevant statutory provisions.

3. The Act was brought on the statute book for making provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes. Section 2 (s) defines "workman" to mean.

"any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act i