B. H. MARLAPALLE, J.

I have gone through the majority judgment written by Chavan J., for himself and for Dalvi J., holding that the powers of seizure under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 are not applicable for the immovable property and with respect I could not persuade or agree with the same view. Hence this separate judgment.

2. A Division Bench of this Court while hearing this petition was confronted with two divergent findings on the issue as to whether an immovable property could be seized under Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “the Code”). As per the petitioners Section 102 of the Code envisages seizure of only movable property, but the respondents, including the State of Maharashtra, contended before the Division Bench that the word “any property” used in Section 102 of the Code cannot be restricted to movable property alone and immovable property can also be seized under the said Section. The Division Bench in its order dated 1st April, 2010 observed in para 12 as under:-

“12. Having gone through Tapas Neogy [(1999) 7 SCC 685], we are inclined to hold that it is possible to urge that in Tapas Neogy, the Supreme Court was