2011 (6) All MR 92
High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MRIDULA BHATKAR
Abedali Khan s/o Rahematali Khan
Versus
Devidas s/o Dhonduji Poghe
WRIT PETITION NO.5381 OF 2011
Decided on : 28-09-2011
While submitting the terms of the compromise, it is mandatory that at least one of the grounds for eviction which is available under Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act ought to have been mentioned in the compromise purshis or there should be a clear indication of such grounds which might have been pleaded either in the plaint by landlord or in the written statement if the landlord is a defendant. Thereafter, it is the duty of the Court while recording the compromise, to satisfy itself that any ground under Section 16 ought to have been mentioned in the compromise and then accept it. In case of Roshan Lal, the Apex Court has enlightened on this issue and has held :
"If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant’s eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law."
Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts or on their admission in a compromise either expressed or implied is not different.
Thus, in the terms of compromise why landlord wants premises and the ground, which is available under Section 16 should reflect in the compromise, then only that compromise become executable.
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 - Section 16-Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXIII, Rule 3-Interpretation of statute-Rent Control Act, 1999, a special statute wherein Section 16 deals with grounds of eviction and entitlement of possession under specific grounds- However Order XXIII, Rule 3 of Code, a procedural law, enabling compromise beyond subject-matter of suit-By harmonious interpretation a balance between statutory provisions under Rent Act and procedural law can be achieved.-Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a procedural law, enabling the compromise beyond the subject-matter of the suit. However, the Maharashtra Rent Control Act is a special statute wherein Section 16 deals with the grounds of eviction and entitlement of the possession under specific grounds. Undoubtedly, the substantive Act will have priority over the procedural law. Therefore, by harmonious interpretation a balance between the procedural law and statutory provisions under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act can be achieved.
MAHARASHTRA RENT CONTROL ACT, 1999 - Sections 15 and 16 - CPC, Order XXIII, Rule 3 - Suits for eviction. Eviction suits governed under Act 1999, attracts Order XXIII, Rule 3 of Code and Order XXIII, Rule 3 is not violative to statute.
There is no bar on parties contracting out compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even for vacating the rental premises and consequential eviction on failure to vacate the same. Order XXIII, Rule 3 is applicable to the eviction suits governed under special statute like Maharashtra Rent Control Act and is not violative to the statute. In the compromise, landlord and tenant one of the party or parties mutually agree to give away their rights and accept certain terms.
MAHARASHTRA RENT CONTROL ACT, 1999 - Section 16 - CPC, Section 2(3) - Eviction suit. In terms of compromise, why landlord wants premises and ground which is available under Section 16 of Act should reflect in compromise, then only said compromise becomes executable.
Thus, while submitting the terms of the compromise, it is mandatory that at least one of the grounds for eviction which is available under Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act ought to have been mentioned in the compromise purshis or there should be a clear indication of such ground which might have been pleaded either in the plaint by landlord or in the written statement if the landlord is a defendant. Thereafter, it is the duty of the Court while recording the compromise, to satisfy itself that any ground under Section 16 ought to have been mentioned in the compromise and then accept it.
Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requisite facts or on their admission in a compromise either expressed or implied is not different. Thus, in the terms of compromise why landlord wants premises and the ground, which is available under Section 16 should reflect in the compromise, then only that compromise becomes executable. On this background, the present compromise is to be looked into. In the compromise purshis, the status of the parties as landlord and tenant is accepted No ground which is available under Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act is mentioned, indicated or reflected.
Therefore, the decree based upon the terms of the compromise being contrary to Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, becomes unexecutable. Going back to the definition of Decree Holder, though the defendant-landlord is having a decree/order in his favour, the same is not executable, as in the compromise no ground available under Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act is mentioned or clearly indicated. So, eviction of the tenant contrary to Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act is violative to the said special statute.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 2(3)-Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, Section 16-Decree holder-Executable order-Requirement as to-Status of landlord in case of compromise with tenant-Grounds available under Section 16 of Act, not mentioned or reflected in deed of compromise-Decree based upon terms of such compromise becomes unexecutable-Landlord would not be a decree-holder.-In the compromise purshis, the status of the parties as landlord and tenant is accepted. No ground which is available under Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act is mentioned, indicated or reflected. Therefore, the decree based upon the terms of the compromise being contrary to Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, becomes unexecutable.
Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. With the consent of parties, this petition is heard finally at the stage of admission.
2. By this writ petition, petitioner takes an exception to the order dated 2nd May 2011 passed by 5th Civil Judge, Junior Division, Hingoli wherein the objection raised by the petitioner/judgment debtor in Execution Proceedings No.3 of 2011 was rejected.
3. Petitioner has filed a Civil Suit bearing No.96/2010 on 6.8.2010 for injunction in which it is prayed that the respondent/defendant be restrained from evicting the petitioner, without due process of law. It is the case of the petitioner that in the month of February 2000, respondent let out his house No.7 for rent of Rs.500/-per month and since then he is residing there as a tenant by paying amount of Rs.500/-from time to time without any arrears. Respondent in 2010, started disturbing the possession of the petitioner and directed him to vacate the premises. Respondent had entered the house and asked him to vacate it. Respondent filed written statement on 23.9.2010 and denied all the averments made and contentions raised by the petitioner. Respondent denied that petitioner is a tenant and is paying rent of Rs.500/-per month. It was contended that petitioner has deceptively inducted himself in the said house and has illegally taken the possession of the house from one Suryawanshi. The parties thereafter arrived at settlement and they submitted written compromise purshis on 28.9.2010 before the Court. The Court, on the same day recorded presence of the parties along with the advocates and verified that the contents of compromise which were affirmed by both the parties and passed the order accordingly.
4. As per the terms of the compromise, petitioner was supposed to vacate the house on 8.12.2010 and petitioner was allowed to reside till then without payment of any rent. It was agreed by the parties that if petitioner fails to vacate the premises, then respondent has right to take out execution proceedings against the petitioner.
5. Petitioner did not vacate the premises. Hence, respondent took out execution proceedings in R.D.No.10/2010. Petitioner, being a judgment debtor filed objection to the execution petition. He challenged the (execution proceedings on the point) validity of compromise recorded under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and execution therein. It was contended that petitioner-judgment debtor is a tenant and, therefore, he cannot be evicted pursuant to the compromise, which is contrary to the law. The executing Judge heard both the parties and rejected the objection raised by the petitioner. Hence this petition.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner has filed a suit for injunction, which was compromised before the trial Court. So, the petitioner is a plaintiff and decree cannot be executed against the petitioner/plaintiff. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner, a tenant can be evicted by the landlord only in the proceedings filed by the landlord under Section 16 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. He submitted that the petitioner being a tenant has filed the suit for injunction, this fact cannot be ignored. In support of his submissions, he relied on following rulings :
(i) Firozi Lal Jain V/s Man Mal and another, reported in AIR 1970 SUPREME COURT 794;
(ii) Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others Vs. K.L.Bansal, reported in AIR 1970 SUPREME
COURT 838;
(iii) K.K.Chari Vs. R.M.Seshadri, reported in AIR 1970 SUPREMECOURT 1311
(iv) Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra, reported in (1990) 1 Supreme Court Cases 193
(v) Kolhapur Motor Transport Producers and Consumers Co-operative Society Ltd., Vs. Ramchandra Mahipatrao Rane and ors., reported in 1990 (O) BCI 114
He argued that the the compromise was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court hence, trial Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to compromise the suit.
7. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent
Firozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and another
Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others Vs. K.L.Bansal
Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra
Gangadeep Pratishthan Pvt. Ltd.
Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) by L.R. Vs. Rajinder Singh and Ors.
Mathulla Verghese & another Vs. Vijaya Rajaratnam (Mrs.) and ors.
Roshan Lal and another Vs. Madan Lal and others. AIR 1975 SC 2130
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