Judgement

UNTWALIA, J.:- This appeal by special leave has been filed by the tenant-defendants. The plaintiff-respondents, the landlords, filed a suit against the appellants in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior for a decree for eviction from the suit premises and for certain other reliefs. The appellants eviction was sought on statement of facts mentioned in paragraph 3 of the plaint which squarely fell within clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The appellants filed a written statement and in paragraph 3, they denied the respondents assertion to plaint, paragraph 3. It appears that the suit which was filed in the year 1966 proceeded to trial in October, 1967 and some evidence was adduced. But eventually, the parties entered into a compromise, filed a petitions to that effect in the Trial Court which passed a decree for eviction and other reliefs in January 1968 in accordance with the terms of the compromise, Pursuant to the said compromise decree the appellants were to vacate the shop the suit premises - by 31-12-1970. On their failure to do so, execution was levied by the respondents. The appellants objected to the execution on the ground that the compromise decree was void and inexecutable as being against the provisions of the Act. The execution court accepted the appellants objection to the execution of the decree and dismissed the execution case. A miscellaneous appeal filed by the respondents was dismissed by the Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior. They preferred a second miscellaneous appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court A learned single Judge following the Bench decision of that Court in Smt. Chandan Bai v. Surjan, AIR 1972 Madh Pra 106 came to the conclusion that the decree was not a nullity and was executable. Hence this appeal by the tenant judgment-debtors.

2. The point which falls for determination in this appeal is not res-integra and has been the subject-matter of consideration in several decisions of this Court. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass (1969) 2 SCR 432 a decree for eviction based on an award without anything more was found to be a nullity as it was held to have been passed against the prohibitory mandate of Section 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Following the said decision the compromise decree was also held to be a nullity in the case of Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal, (1969) 2 SCR 1048. The earlier two decisions were followed again in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal, AIR 1970 SC 794. In all these three cases the decrees were found to have violated Section 13 (1) of the Delhi Act of 1952.

3. The law was reviewed exhaustively by this Court in K. K. Chari v. R. M. Seshadri (1973) 3 SCR 691. Vaidialingam. J. delivering the judgment on his behalf as also on behalf of Dua, J. pointed out that under the terms of the compromise under consideration in that case the defendant had withdrawn all his defence to the application filed by the landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. The three earlier cases of this Court were distinguished and it was said at page 704 "The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void". And finally it was held "it is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord s claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry." One of us (Alagiriswami, J.) while agreeing with Vaidialingam, J. added a few words of his own. In the separate judgment it has been pointed out that the view taken by Grover