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2012 Supreme(Bom) 1157

High Court of Judicature at Bombay
D.Y. CHANDRACHUD & R.D. DHANUKA, JJ.
Nitin Shankar Deshpande
Versus
The President of India & Others
Public Interest Litigation No. 90 of 2012
Decided on : 02-07-2012

Advocates appeared:
R1 to R4, Janak Dwarkadas, Senior Advocate with M.S. Karnik, R5, Dr. Virendra Tulzapurkar, Senior Advocate with N.V.Walawalkar, Senior Advocate & Vikrant Walawalkar i/b. P.S. Dani, R6, V.A. Thorat, Senior Advocate with P.K. Dhakephalkar, Senior Advocate i/b. P.J. Thorat, R7, Aspi Chinoy, Senior Advocate with Zaal Andhyarujina, Farid Karachiwala & Bhavik Manek i/b. Wadia Ghandy & Co., R8, Amit Borkar with Akshay P. Shinde, R9, Srihari Aney, Senior Advocate with Vineet Naik & Ms. Deepa Ahuja, Syed Ejaz Abbas Naqvi for Intervenor Samajwadi Legal Sabha (Cell), Advocates.

The plain language of constitutional provisions, legislative history, and distinction in tenure between different classes of judges are crucial in interpreting and applying legal provisions.

Headnote:

Article 220 - Interpretation of Prohibition on Practicing - Constitution of India - Article 220

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought a writ to restrain former additional judges from practicing before any court in India, except the Supreme Court or the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, based on the interpretation of Article 220 of the Constitution.

Finding of the Court:

The court analyzed the submissions regarding the interpretation of Article 220 and the distinction between permanent and additional judges. It found that the plain language of Article 220 prohibits only permanent judges from practicing in the same high court, and this prohibition does not extend to former additional judges.

Issues: Interpretation of Article 220, distinction between permanent and additional judges, and the legislative history underlying the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plain language of Article 220, the distinction in tenure between permanent and additional judges, and the legislative history supported the interpretation that the prohibition on practicing applies only to permanent judges.

Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and the court found no reason to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Judgment :

DR. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

1. In these proceedings which have been filed in the public interest, the Petitioner has sought an appropriate writ, restraining Respondents 5 to 9 from pleading or acting before any Court or before any other authority in India, except the Supreme Court of India or any other High Courts, other than the High Court of Judicature at Bombay “in view of the provisions of the Constitution of India”. Respondents 5 to 9 are enrolled as Advocates on the rolls of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa. Each of them was appointed as an Additional Judge of this Court. Each of them tendered his resignation during the course of the term of appointment as Additional Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The most recent of the resignations was that of the Ninth Respondent on 8 May 2012, while the farthest in point of time, is that of the Fifth Respondent, who demitted office fourteen years ago. All of them have reverted to practise at the Bar. The central point involved in these proceedings turns upon the construction of Article 220 of the Constitution. According to the Petitioner, though Article 220 in its present form contains a prohibition on a person who has held office as a permanent Judge of a High Court from pleading or acting in any Court or before any authority in India except the Supreme Court and other High Courts, a purposive interpretation must be placed on those provisions so as to bring within their purview even Additional Judges who have before being confirmed in service relinquished office.

2. Now, in this background, it would be necessary to record the submissions which have been urged on behalf of the Petitioner. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits that:

(i) Article 220 of the Constitution should be interpreted to include Additional Judges;

(ii) The object of Article 220 would be defeated if Additional Judges are excluded from the purview of the provision;

(iii) Additional Judges of the High Court are equivalent, in all respects, to permanent Judges. The position, functions and powers of Additional Judges are akin, in all respects, to permanent Judges and the Constitution prescribes the same qualifications for their appointment;

(iv) A literal interpretation of Article 220 is not desirable in the present scenario and would defeat the object and purpose of Article 220;

(v) As a matter of constitutional practice, it has now become conventional to appoint Judges as Additional Judges in the High Courts, in the first instance, and thereafter to appoint them as permanent Judges. Though the underlying rationale for Article 224 was to appoint Additional Judges when there was a temporary increase in work, that is not how the provision has been practically applied in the last several decades. Consequently, the interpretation that must be placed on Article 220 must have relevance in view of the constitutional practice;

(vi) The independence of the judiciary is sought to be protected by introducing a constitutional restraint, prohibiting persons who have held offices as permanent Judges from practicing in the same High Court. In the event that a person who has held office as an Additional Judge is allowed to practice before the same High Court, that would result in inroads on the independence of the judiciary. The perspective of the litigating public and of the community at large is of relevance in maintaining the independence of the judiciary and allowing a person, who has held office as Additional Judge, to practice before the same Court would result in an apprehension on the part of litigants and the community on whether a truly independent dispensation of justice has taken place;

(vii) The words “as a permanent judge” should be interpreted to mean 'like a permanent judge' or 'in the same capacity as a permanent judge'.

3. These submissions have been opposed on behalf of Respondents 5 to 9 each of whom is represented by Counsel. Counsel appearing on behalf of the































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