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1952 Supreme(Bom) 64

HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
CHAGLA, GAJENDRAGADKAR, JJ.
Rampratap Jaidayal
Versus
Dominion of India
First Appeal No.937 of 1951
Decided On : 25-06-1952

Advocates:
M.M. Javeri and V.J. Taraporewala, with Gagrat and Co., for Appellants; G.N. Joshi, with Little and Co., for Respondent.

The exemption of the Government from the application of the Rent Restriction Act is reasonable and does not offend against Art.14 of the Constitution.

Headnote:

RENT RESTRICTION ACT - Exemption of Government from the application of the Act - Whether S.4(1) of the Act applies to the Union Government - Whether the classification made by the State is reasonable - Whether the legislation offends against Art.14 of the Constitution.

Fact of the Case:

The defendants became tenants of flat No.4 and garage No.6 in a building known as "Roshera". This building was owned by a private individual. But in January 1948 the property was purchased by the Union of India. In May 1949 the Union of India served upon the defendants a notice to quit, and as the defendants failed to give possession, the suit was filed from which this appeal arises.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that S.4(1) of the Act applies to the Union Government and that the classification made by the State is reasonable. The Court further held that the legislation does not offend against Art.14 of the Constitution.

Issues: 1. Whether S.4(1) of the Rent Restriction Act applies to the Union Government? 2. Whether the classification made by the State is reasonable? 3. Whether the legislation offends against Art.14 of the Constitution?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that S.4(1) of the Act applies to the Union Government because the expression "the Government" in that section includes both the Central Government and the State Government. 2. The Court held that the classification made by the State is reasonable because there is a rational connection between the object of the Act and the exemption of the Government from the application of the Act. 3. The Court held that the legislation does not offend against Art.14 of the Constitution because the classification made by the State is not arbitrary or capricious.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.

Judgement

CHAGLA, C.J. :- This appeal arises out of a decree of ejectment passed by the learned City Civil Judge Mr. K.M. Vakil. It would appear that the defendants became tenants of flat No.4 and garage No.6 in a building known as "Roshera". This building was owned by a private individual. But in January 1948 the property was purchased by the Union of India. In May 1949 the Union of India served upon the defendants a notice to quit, and as the defendants failed to give possession, the suit was filed from which this appeal arises.

2. The defendants sought protection of the Rent Restriction Act. The answer given to that plea by the plaintiff was that under S.4, Rent Restriction Act, the Union Government was exempted from the application of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the defendants could not claim the protection of the Act. This contention was accepted by the learned Judge, who in a well-considered judgment considered the various pleas advanced by the defendants and decided against them.

3. Before us it has been contended by Mr. Javeri in the first instance that S.4(1) of the Act does pot apply to the Union Government and that it only applies to the State Government. That section is in the following terms:

"This Act shall not apply to any premises belonging to the Govt. or a local authority or apply as against the Government to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government; but it shall apply in respect of premises let to the Government or a local authority.

The short submission made by Mr. Javeri is that the expression the Government as used in S.4(1) means the State Government, and not both the State Government and the Union Government. Now, the Government is not defined in the Act, nor do we find any definition of that expression in the Bombay General Clauses Act. But there is a definition given in the Central General Clauses Act and it is necessary to turn to that definition. Under S.3(23) Government or the Government is defined as including both the Central Government and any State Government; but by reason of S.3 this definition only applies when this expression occurs in Central Acts and Regulations. But we have S.4A which applies the definitions of certain expressions set out in S.3 to all Indian laws, and one of such expressions is Government. Therefore, it is clear that when Government occurs in any State legislation it means both the Central Government and the State Government. But what is rightly pointed out by Mr. Javeri is that S.4A only refers to the expression Government and not to the expression the Government, and it seems this has been done for obvious reasons. If a State legislation refers to the Government, ordinarily that expression would mean the Government of that particular State; it is only when the State legislation would refer to Government and not the Government, that Government in that indefinite sense would mean both the Central Government and the State Government, and, therefore, there was good reason why by S.4A both the expressions Government and the Government were not made applicable to all Indian laws. Therefore, as far as the General Clauses Act stands, there is no definition of the expression the Government which applies to State laws. Therefore, we must approach the subject unassisted by any definition appearing in either the All India General Clauses Act or the local General Clauses Act which would help us in construing this section.

4. Now, turning to the Act itself, it is significant that in S.4 itself the Legislature has used the expression the Government in sub-S.(1) and the expression the State Government in sub-Ss.(2) and (3). Now, it is a well-established canon of construction that when the Legislature uses different expressions in the same statute - and the more so in the same section -, as far as possible the Court must attribute to the Legislature the intention of co

















































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