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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
H.J. KANIA C.J.I., FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,. B.K. MUKHERJEA AND S.R. DAS JJ.
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury - Petitioner
Versus
The Union of India and others - Opposite Party.
Petition No. 72 of 1950.
4th December 1950
Advocates appeared
V. K.T. Chari, Advocate, J. S. Dawdo, Alladi Kuppuswami and C. R. Pattabhi Raman, Advocates, instructed by M. S. K. Aiyangar, Agent - for Petitioner; M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N. Joshi, Advocate, with him), instructed by P. A. Mehta, Agent (for Nos. 1 & 2) and G. N. Joshi Advocate instructed by Rajinder Narain Agent- (for Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7 to 10) - for Opposite Party.
-the relief which is appropriate to the facts found and the legal position determined should be awarded
-appropriate relief which can be granted, should be granted
-Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company (Emergency Provision) Ordinance 2 of 1950 (Act 28 of 1950) – held not covered by exception in clause (5)(b)(ii),violates fundamental right of Company under clause (2) of Art. 31.
-also held, case of Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41=1951 SCJ 29=1950 SCR 869 – Not applicable here – Distinguishable – Court to discover true character behind name, form and appearance – State’s power of eminent domain discussed and also correlation between Articles 19 and 31 – Art. 19 for Citizens, Art. 31 to person in general;
-held, petition under Article 32 will not be thrown away just because proper writ or direction has not been sought for.
-held, cannot really have affinity with proceeding under Article 32.
-held, complainant’s need and absence of adequate remedy are to be clearly brought out to claim extraordinary relief under Article 32. Possibility of loss to someone else or likely injury to others in race or occupation are of no avail to complainant in a writ petition. Where facts clearly establish injury to the complainant and not to others that judicial interference would be justified.
-held that in Habeas Corpus writ petition it is a recognised exception to normal procedure that not only the person detained but any person, provided he is not an absolute stranger, can institute proceedings for liberating another person from an Illegal Imprisonment.
-held, both may like to enforce Fundamental Rights, but individual shareholder cannot challenge impugned Statute which affects the Fundamental Right of the company, unless it can be shown to the extent it affects his rights also.
-see decision in Chananjit Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R I95I SC 4I, see also decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC564=(1970) 3 SCR 531.
Judgment
Kania, C.J.I.:- This is an application by the holder of one ordinary share of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd., for a writ of mandamus and certain other reliefs under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. The authorised capital of the Company is Rs.48 lakhs and the paid-up capital is Rs. 32 lakhs half of which is made up of fully paid ordinary shares of Rs.1000 each.
2. I have read the judgment prepared by Mukherjea J. In respect of the arguments advanced to challenge the validity of the impugned Act under Arts. 31 and l9, Constitution of India, I agree with his line of reasoning and conclusion and have nothing more to add.
3. On the question whether the impugned Act infringes Art. 14, two points have to be considered. The first is whether one individual shareholder can, under the circumstances of the case and particularly when one of the respondents is the Company which opposes the petition, challenge the validity of the Act on the ground that it is a piece of discriminatory legislation, creates inequality before the law and violates the principle of equal protection of the laws under Art. 14, Constitution of India. The second is whether in fact the petitioner has shown that the Act runs contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution. In this case having regard to my conclusion on the second point, I do not think it is necessary to pronounce a definite opinion on the first point. I agree with the line of reasoning and the conclusion of Mukherjea J. as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act on the ground that it infringes Art.14 of the Constitution and have nothing more to add.
4. In my opinion, therefore, this petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
5. Fazl Ali, J. :- I am strongly of the opinion that this petition should be dismissed with costs.
6. The facts urged in the petition and the points raised on behalf of the petitioner before us are fully set forth in the judgment of my brethren, Sastri, Mukherjea and Das JJ. and I do not wish to repeat them here. It is sufficient to say that the main grounds on which the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950 (XXVIII [28] of 1950), which will hereinafter be referred to as "the Act"), has been assailed, is that it infringes three fundamental rights, these being : (1) the right to property secured by Art. 31 of the Constitution; (2) the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, guaranteed to every citizen by Art.19 (1) (f); and (3) the right to equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by Art.14.
7. It has been held in a number of cases in the United States of America that no one except those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of the constitutionality of that law. This principle has been very clearly stated by Hughes J. in McCabe v. Atchison, (1914) 235 U. S. 151 in these words: "It is an elementary principle that in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant s need of it and the absence of an adequate remedy at law must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons who may be injured are persons of the sums race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant-not to others-which justifies judicial interference." On this statement of the law, with which I entirely agree, the scope of the discussion on this petition is greatly restricted at least in regard to the first two fundamental rights. The Company and the shareholders are in law separate entities, and if the allegation is made that any property belonging to the Company has been taken possession of without compensation or the right enjoyed by the Company under Art. 19 (1) (f) has been infringed, it would be for the Company to come forward to assert or vindicate its own rights and not for any individual shareholder to do so. In this view, the only question which has to
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