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1955 Supreme(Bom) 6

HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
CHAGLA, DIXIT, JJ.
Mahadeo Dhondu Jadhav
Versus
Labour Appellate Tribunal of India
Special Civil Appn. No.2567 of 1954
Decided On : 19-01-1955

Advocates:
D.S. Nargolkar, for Petitioner; M.P. Amin, Advocate General with B. Narayan Swami, with Kanga and Co., for Respondents.

The jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is limited to considering whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer and whether the action taken by the employer is bona fide. The IDAT is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the employer and the employees before granting permission.

Headnote:

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL - JURISDICTION - SECTION 22 - INTERPRETATION - SCOPE AND AMBIT - PERMISSION TO ALTER CONDITIONS OF SERVICE - REQUIREMENTS - ADJUDICATION OF DISPUTE NOT MANDATORY - DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECTIONS 22 AND 23 - PROTECTION OF WORKERS' RIGHTS - NO PREJUDICE TO EMPLOYEES - CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED - AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a union representing workers in a textile mill, challenged an order of the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal (IDAT) granting permission to the mill to change the conditions of service of its workers by requiring them to attend to four sides of ring frames instead of two. The change was made during the pendency of an appeal before the IDAT.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the IDAT had the jurisdiction to grant permission to the mill to change the conditions of service of its workers under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The court found that the IDAT had conducted a prima facie inquiry into the merits of the matter and had concluded that the change would not impose an undue strain on the workers and was not inspired by any wrong motive. The court also found that the IDAT had correctly interpreted Section 22 and that it was not required to adjudicate the dispute between the mill and the workers before granting permission.

Issues: 1. Whether the IDAT had the jurisdiction to grant permission to the mill to change the conditions of service of its workers under Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950? 2. Whether the IDAT was required to adjudicate the dispute between the mill and the workers before granting permission?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and found that it did not require the IDAT to adjudicate the dispute between the employer and the employees before granting permission to alter the conditions of service. The court held that the IDAT's jurisdiction under Section 22 was limited to considering whether a prima facie case had been made out by the employer and whether the action taken by the employer was bona fide. 2. The court distinguished Section 22 from Section 23 of the Act, which provides for the adjudication of complaints by employees alleging contravention of Section 22. The court held that Section 23 conferred a right on employees to have an industrial dispute adjudicated, but that this right was not conferred on employers under Section 22.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the IDAT had not exceeded its jurisdiction in granting permission to the mill to change the conditions of service of its workers.

Judgement

CHAGLA, C.J.:- This petition raises a rather important question as to the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal under S.22 of Act XLVIII of 1950. On 21-1-1954, respondents No.2, the New China Mills gave a notice of change under S.42 Bombay Industrial Relations Act, with regard to change in items 1 and 4 of Sch. IV to that Act, and in substance the change which the mills intended to bring about was that instead of the workers attending to two sides of ring frames in the Ring Department, the workers had to attend to four sides.

Conciliation proceedings were commenced on 28-1-1954, and on 9-9-1954, these proceedings failed and a report to that effect was made by the Conciliator. On 22-9-1954, an application was made by the mills for permission to bring about this change under S.22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act and on 15-10-1954, the Appellate Tribunal gave its permission to the mills. It is this order that is challenged by the petitioner.

2. Turning to the relevant section, it provides that:

"During the period of thirty days allowed for the filing of an appeal under section 10 or during the pendency of any appeal under this Act, no employer shall:

(a) alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such appeal, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the filing of such appeal, or...save with the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal." We are not concerned with Cl. (b) of that section in this petition. It is not disputed that the petitioner was concerned in an appeal which was pending before the Appellate Tribunal, and therefore if the employer wanted to alter to the prejudice of the workmen any condition of service, he had to obtain the express permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal.

3. Now, what is contended by Mr. Nargolkar is that when an application under S.22 is made by the employer, the Appellate Tribunal should only give its permission after an adjudication of the dispute between the employer and the employee. It is contended that S.22 confers upon the Appellate Tribunal the same jurisdiction that S.23 does. For the purpose of this argument it is necessary to look at the provisions of S.23.

That section confers certain important right upon the employee and the right is that if an employer contravenes the provisions of S.22, then the employee aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing to the Appellate Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint the Appellate Tribunal has been given the jurisdiction to decide the complaint as if it were an appeal pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and it is incumbent upon the Appellate Tribunal to pronounce its decision upon the complaint and the provisions of the Act shall apply accordingly.

Therefore, as far as the construction of S.23 is concerned, there can be no doubt that on a complaint made by the employee with regard to the contravention of S.22 not only has the Appellate Tribunal to consider whether an action has been taken by the employer under S.22 without the permission in writing of the Appellate Tribunal, but also the merits of the dispute between the employer and the employee.

What is suggested is that whereas S.23 gives the right to the employee to have an industrial dispute adjudicated, a similar right is conferred upon the employer under S.22, and if the employer goes for permission to the Appellate Tribunal, he can only get the permission after the Appellate Tribunal had adjudicated upon the dispute, and only after the Appellate Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the dispute must be decided in favour of the employer that the Appellate Tribunal should give the requisite permission under S.22.

Apart from authorities and apart from any other argument advanced by Mr. Nargolkar with which we shall presently deal, it is clear on the language itself of the two sections, viz. Ss.22 and 23, that the ambit of the jurisdi































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