A new Act of Limitation which provides a longer period does not revive a remedy which was barred under the law of limitation in force before the new law came into effect.

JUDGMENT : - The present appeal arises from a suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of a sum of Rs.7,000 due upon a khata dated 15-12-1934, for Rs.9,000 signed by two persons Motibhai Ishwarbhai and Jiwabhai Javerbhai; Both the executants specifically say in the khata that they would pay the amount of Rs.9,000 on demand. The khata obviously, therefore, is a promissory note. It is not necessary to state all the defences which were taken on behalf of the representatives of Motibhai Ishwarbhai and Jiwabhai Javerbhai, for the reason that the only question in this appeal is one of limitation. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that the suit was barred by limitation.

The suit was upon a promissory note dated 15-12-1934, and was actually filed on 19-10-1946. In order to bring the suit within limitation, the plaintiff relied upon a part payment dated 22-10-1940, acknowledged in the handwriting of Kantilal Vithalbhai, the grandson of Jiwabhai. The part payment is endorsed upon the promissory note itself in the hand of Kantilal Vithalbhai. The defendants disputed this endorsement, but the learned trial Judge has found the endorsement proved. The defendants contended even so that this endorsement did not serve to save limitation, because the plaintiffs suit upon the promissory note was barred by limitation before the endorsement was made by Kantilal Vithalbhai.

It appears that when Act No.1 of 1987 S.Y. (Mudat Nibandh No.1 of 1987) of the former Baroda State was enacted, the rule of limitation in regard to promissory notes was contained in Art.63, and the period was, as in what was formerly British India, three years. The Act contained a section at that time, No.6, sub-s. (1) of which provided an enlarged period of limitation of six years, where the suit was filed upon a writing or a document and was a suit to which certain articles, including Art.47, which was for a suit for money lent, applied, but at that time Art.63 was not included in the articles enumerated in S.6(1). The Baroda Limitation Act was, however, amended from time to time. It was amended for the first time by Act No.47 of 1934, which came into force on 8-11-1934. It was amended a second time by Act No.3 of 1936, which came into force on 30-1-1936.

It is not in dispute, however, that Art.63 of the Act was not included among the articles enumerated in S.6(1) by either of these amendments. It was included among those articles by Act No.21 of 1939, which came into force on 25-5-1939. It is the contention of the defendants that before this Act came into force, the period of limitation for suits upon promissory notes was three years, with the result that there being no acknowledgment before 25-5-1939, when the Act No.21 of 1939 came into force, the plaintiffs suit upon Ex.39 regarded as a promissory note was barred by time, and his remedy was not revived by that Act which was not retrospective.

2. On the other hand, it is the contention of the plaintiff that the plaintiffs suit is not a suit upon a promissory note. The plaintiffs suit is a suit for money lent, which will be governed by Art.47, or a suit on an account stated, which would be governed by Art.54. Now, Art.54 also was not included among the articles enumerated in S.6(1) when the Act came into force originally. It was included among those articles for the first time by Act No.3 of 1936, which came into force on 30-1-1936.

It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiffs suit was not barred by time on that date if it is a suit on an account stated. So in any case the period of limitation for the plaintiffs suit, regarded as a suit for an account stated, was six years, and inasmuch as on 22-10-1940, Kantilal Vithalbhai, the grandson of Jiwabhai made payment of a sum of Rs.3,000 before the period of limitation was over, a fresh starting point of limitation was provided by the payment by Kantilal on that date, and the plaintiffs suit was consequently within time.

3. In the alternative, it is