Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies when a Hindu female is given maintenance from the income of property in lieu of her share in the property, which is an acknowledgment of her pre-existing right to the property, and she is in possession of the property.

1. Heard Mr. A.V. Anturkar, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. V.S.Kapse, learned counsel for respondent nos.1(g),1(h) and 1(i), Mr. A.Y.Sakhare, learned Senior Counsel for respondent no.2 in both the Appeals at length.

2. The short question that falls for determination in these Appeals is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is sub-section(1) or sub-section(2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, 'Act') applies. In that context, it is appropriate to quote the observations made by Honourable Mr. Justice P.N.Bhagwati (as the learned Chief Justice of India then was) in paragraph 67 of V. Tulasamma Vs. Sesha Reddy, (1977) 3 Supreme Court Cases 99):-

“…The question is of some complexity and it has evoked wide diversity of judicial opinion not only amongst the different High Courts but also within some of the High Courts themselves. It is indeed unfortunate that though it became evident as far back as 1967 that Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of construction in cases where property was received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and divergence of judicial opinion was creating a situation which might well be described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always 'possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature, for all these years did not care to step in to remove the constructional dilemma facing the courts and adopted an attitude of indifference and inaction, untroubled and unmoved by the large number of cases on this point encumbering the files of different courts in the country, when by the simple expedient of an amendment, it could have silenced judicial conflict and put an end to needless litigation. This is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers. It illustrates forcibly the need of an authority or body to be set up by the Government or the Legislature which would constantly keep in touch with the adjudicators authorities in the country as also with the legal profession and immediately respond by making recommendations for suitable amendments whenever it is found that a particular statutory provision is, by reason of inapt language or unhappy draftsmanship, creating difficulty of construction or is otherwise inadequate or defective or is not well conceived and is consequently counter-productive of the result it was intended to achieve. if there is a close interaction between the adjudicators wing of the State and a dynamic and ever-alert authority or body which responds swiftly to the drawbacks and deficiencies in the law in action, much of the time and money, which is at present expended in fruitless litigation, would be saved and law would achieve a certain amount of clarity, certainty and simplicity which alone can make it easily intelligible to the people.”

3. Second Appeal No.61 of 2002 is preferred by the original defendants challenging the Judgment and decree dated 31.7.1997 passed by the learned 11th Jt. Civil Judge, Jr.Dn, Pune in Regular Civil Suit No.943 of 1987 as also the Judgment and decree dated 4.9.2001 passed by the learned 6th Addl. District Judge, Pune in Civil Appeal No.911 of 1997. Regular Civil Suit No.943 of 1987 was instituted on 2.5.1987 for rendition of accounts of yearly income by the appellant-Yeshwant Lonkar (Original Defendant), since deceased from the year 1946 derived from 3/5th share out of lands bearing Survey No.31/2/8, admeasuring 1 H. 96 R and Survey No.26/8-C+9+10 admeasuring 3 H.,08 R, situate at Mundhawa, Tq.Haveli, District-Pune (for short, 'suit lands'). The Courts below decreed the suit instituted by the respondents.

4. Second Appeal No.62 of 2002 is preferred by the original defendants challenging the