Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally, by consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties.

2. Since there are common facts and issues, so also arguments are revolving around the same subject and as the Trial Court has passed a common order, hence this common judgment.

3. The Appellant (Defendant No.6) being aggrieved by the order below Exhibit5 in all Suits, dated 9 May 2012, passed by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, S.D., Thane, filed these separate Appeals. The operative part of the impugned order as under:

“1. Every application, Exh.5, in Spl. Civil Suit No.200/2012, 201/2012 and 202/2012 is allowed.

2. All the defendants of above said respective suits are hereby restrained, temporarily, from entering over the respective suit property, till the date of decision of these respective suits.

3. All the defendants of above said respective suits, are restrained, temporarily, till the date of decision of these respective suits from creating third party interest in any of the portion of the respective suit properties of the above said three suits.

4. Costs of these applications shall abide by ultimate result of these suits.

5. Copy of this order shall be kept in each of the above-said 3 suits.

6. Copy of this order shall be kept in each of the above-said 3 suits.”

4. Admittedly, the prayers in the Suits filed on 14.3.2012, though properties are different, are common. The prayers (a),(b), (c) and (d) are as under:

“(a) It may be declared that the suit agreement dated 2.3.1989 which stood modified and altered by a supplementary agreement dt:2/2/1990 executed by and between the Plaintiff as a Vendor and Defendant No.1 as Purchaser in respect of the suit property which is duly registered in the office of Sub-Registrar of Assurance on 12.02.1990 stands cancelled, ineffective and not binding upon plaintiff.

(b) It may be declared that the suit agreement dated 19/6/1992 which was entered into between the defendant no.1 as vendor and defendant no.2 as a Purchaser in respect of the suit property is illegal, bad in law, ineffective and not binding upon the plaintiff.

(c) The Consent Decree dt:3/11/2007 passed in Sp. Civil Suit No.662/1994 be set aside and be declared that it is not binding upon the plaintiffs.

(d) It may be declared that the Power of Attorney dt:3/11/2007 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the Mr. Mangalprabhat Lodha and Mr. Bharat K. Shah of Defendant No.2, which is registered with the Sub-Registrar of Assurance Thane 2 at Sr. No.1100/2007 is revoked, cancelled and not subsisting.”

5. The separate applications were filed for the interim injunction and granted by the learned Judge. The prayer clause (c) itself shows that Plaintiffs-Respondent Nos.1 to 21 have challenged the consent decree dated 3 November 2007 passed in Special Civil Suit No.662 of 1994 and prayed to set aside the same and so also the power of attorney dated 3.11.2007. The prayer clauses (a) and (b), admittedly for the transactions based upon agreements dated 2.3.1989, 2.2.1990 and 19.6.1992. There is no dispute that all those transactions revolving around the properties in question and ultimately settled by and between the parties through the consent decree. The Plaintiffs' averments have the foundation of “misrepresentation”, “unlawful”, for all the prayers and also “against the public policy for want of permission” referring to Section 43 of Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short “B.T. & A.L. Act”). So far as other two suits are concerned viz. Suit Nos.201 of 2012 and 202 of 2012 (AO No.611 of 2012 & AO No.612 of 2012), the issue of such permission is not raised.

6. At the threshold, it is necessary to consider and as submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties, the mandate of Order 23 Rule 3A of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short” CPC”) which is reproduced below:

“3A Bar to suit-No suit lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawfu