2013 Supreme(Bom) 1242
BOMBAY HIGH COURT
R.D. DHANUKA, J.
Pradeep Manek Shahani
vs
Rajendra Kumar Shahani
Chamber Summons No. 144 of 2012
Decided On: 09/07/2013
Headnote:Succession Act, 1925 - Section 263 - Letters of administration or probate.
In proceedings for revocation and annulment of probate or letter of administration, beneficiary of Will is neither necessary nor proper party. - On perusal of Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, it is clear that Court can revoke or annul the grant of probate or letter of administration for just cause described in the explanation of Section 263. On perusal. of Section 263, it is clear that if proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance or the person to whom the grant was made has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of that Part amongst various other grounds available, grant of probate or letter of administration may be revoked. In my view, whether action taken by the respondent for obtaining letter of administration was proper or not or was in breach of cause provided in explanation to Section 263 has to be inquired with in this proceedings for revocation of letter of administration granted in favour of the original petitioner. Thus the beneficiary under the Will in respect of which letter of administration has been granted by this Court is neither necessary party nor proper party. The original petitioner would represent interest of the beneficiaries.
However, on perusal of Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, it is clear that whether action on the part of the executor applying for probate or letter of administration was proper or not and whether just cause as described in explanation to Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act is made out by the petitioner or not has to be decided. Beneficiaries thus would not be necessary and proper party to petition for revocation.
1. By this Chamber Summons, applicant seeks his impleadment as Respondent No. 2 to the Misc. Petition No. 87 of 2011 on the ground that the deceased had bequeathed the property known as Gurdasmal Mansion situated at National Library Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai 400 050 in equal shares to the applicant along with the 1st Respondent.
2. Mr. Kapadia, the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant submits that if probate granted by this Court in respect of the last Will of the deceased is revoked, applicant who is one of the beneficiary under the said Will, would be seriously affected and is thus necessary and proper party to the revocation petition filed by the petitioner and should be impleaded. The learned Counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh and others, reported in 1969 Mh LJ 527 and in particular paragraph (3) thereof which reads thus :
3. In support of this appeal, it was contended in the first place that the High Court had reversed the order of the Sessions Judge directing the return of the currency notes without giving a notice to the appellant and without giving an opportunity to it for being heard the argument was stressed that there was a violation of the principle of natural justice and the order of the High Court dated 5th April, 1963 was illegal. It was, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that there was no provision in Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for giving notice to the affected parties and the order of the High Court cannot be challenged on the ground that no hearing was given to the appellant. In our opinion, there is no warrant or justification for the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents. It is true that the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued, or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected. But though the statute is silent and does not expressly require issue of any notice there is in the eyes of law a necessary implication that the party adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order for return of the seized property. The principle is clearly stated in the leading case of Co-oper v. Wands- worth Board of Works,. In that case Section 76 of the Metropolis Local Amendment Act, 1855 authorised the District Board to demolish the building if it had been constructed by the owner without giving notice to the Board of his intention to build. The statute laid down no procedure for the exercise of the power of demolition, and, therefore, the Board demolished the house in exercise of the above power without issuing a notice to the owner of the house. It was held by the Court of Common Pleas that the Board was liable in damages for not having given notice of their order before they proceeded to execute it. Erie, C.J. held that the power was subject to a qualification repeatedly recognised that no man is to be deprived of his property without his having an opportunity of being heard and that this had been applied to many exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all a more judicial proceeding than would be the act of the district board in ordering a house to be pulled down. Willes, J. said that the rule was of universal application and founded upon the plainest principles of justice and Byles, J. said that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The same principle has been reaffirmed in a recent case Ridge v. Baldwin,. In that case, Section 191 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1881 provided that a watch committee may at any time suspend or dismiss any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same. The appellant, who was the chief constable of a borough police force, was dismissed by the watch committee on the ground that he was negli