BOMBAY HIGH COURT AT PANAJI, GOA
F.I. REBELLO, J.
Vishwas Yeshwant and another – Appellant
Versus
Helena Mascarenhas E, and another - Respondents
Writ petition No. 294 of 2003
Decided on: 7th August, 2003
ADJOURNMENT - PROCEDURAL RULES - Order XVII Rule 1 - The judgment discusses the interpretation of Order XVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows the court to grant adjournments. The court deliberates on the meaning of the word 'shall' in the context of the rule and its proviso, and concludes that the word 'shall' should be read as 'may', allowing the court to retain jurisdiction to grant adjournments even after the three adjournments specified in the proviso. The judgment emphasizes that the court's discretion to grant adjournments should be exercised judiciously and only in cases where failure to grant an adjournment would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners challenged the order of the Trial Court closing their evidence, contending that the Court should have exercised its discretion to grant adjournment despite the three adjournments already granted. The respondents opposed the petitioners' request for further adjournment.
Finding of the Court:
The Court interpreted Order XVII Rule 1 and its proviso, concluding that the word 'shall' should be read as 'may', allowing the Court to retain jurisdiction to grant adjournments even after the three adjournments specified in the proviso. The Court held that the power to grant adjournments should be exercised judiciously and only in cases where failure to grant an adjournment would result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the Trial Court was right to reject the application for re-calling the earlier Order in the present case.
Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of Order XVII Rule 1 and its proviso, specifically the meaning of the word 'shall' in the context of granting adjournments.
Ratio Decidendi: The key legal principle established is that the word 'shall' in procedural provisions should be construed as 'may' to allow the court to retain jurisdiction to grant adjournments even after the specified number of adjournments, provided that the power to grant adjournments is exercised judiciously and only in cases where failure to grant an adjournment would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Final Decision: The rule was discharged, and there was no order as to costs.
F.I. Rebello. J.-Rule. Respondents waive service. Heard forthwith.
2. The petitioners by the present petition have impugned the order dated 21st February 2003, of the Trial Court closing the evidence of the petitioners herein. The Trial Court by the impugned order on 21st February 2003 as can be seen from the roznama entry, recorded that the counsel for the plaintiff was present, that the petitioner No. 1jdefendant was present in person the petitioner No. 1 did not file his affidavit by way of examination-in-chief and, accordingly, closed the evidence. The record would show that subsequently an application was taken out by the petitioners herein, which is dated 17th. April 2003. By that application, the petitioners herein had prayed that the roznama Order, dated 21st February 2003, closing the evidence of the defendants be set aside and the defendants be allowed to lead their evidence. The application was opposed by the respondents. The Trial Court, for the reasons recorded in Order, dated 4th June 2003, rejected the application and upheld the objections as raised on behalf of the respondents herein that as the petitioners had taken more than three adjournments, there was no discretion in the Court to grant further time. The petitioners have not challenged this subsequent Order. The effect of this can be considered in the course of discussion.
3. On behalf of the petitioners, their learned counsel points out that if Order XVII, Rule 1 is correctly read, it does not mean that the Court ceases to have jurisdiction to grant time. In the instant case, it is pointed out that from the subsequent order, it is clear that the Trial Court was inclined to grant adjournment but that was only rejected because of objection raised on behalf of the respondents herein.
On behalf of the respondents, one Vito e Saouza Ticlo has filed an affidavit opposing the reliefs as sought for by the petitioners in the present petition.
4. The record would show that the issues were settled on 25th March, 1997. Evidence of the plaintiffs commenced and it was adjourned for cross on 25th September, 2000. On that date, the petitioners' advocate remained absent and the matter was adjourned to 17th October, 2000. On that date also the petitioners' advocate remained absent and the evidence of the witness was closed. The matter was fixed for further evidence on 24th November, 2000, on which date, the petitioners' advocate remained present and moved the Court for adjournment contending that he would move the necessary application for setting aside the order closing evidence on or before the adjourned date of hearing, which was 11th December, 2000. On that day an application was moved for setting aside the Order and giving grounds. That application was dismissed by Order, dated 1st February, 2001. The matter was posted for further evidence and for final arguments on 5th March, 2001. On which date, an application was moved before the Court saying that they were moving the High Court. The matter was adjourned to 19th July, 2001. On the adjourned date neither the petitioners nor their advocate was present nor any Order was produced before the Court. The application moved by the petitioners dated 5th March 2001, was dismissed by Order, dated 19th July, 2001. A fresh application was moved being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 377 of 2001 for setting aside the exparte Order and the ground given was that the petitioners were informed by their advocate that he was unable to appear in the Court as on that date though he had come to Panaji, he could not reach the Court at 10.45 a.m., due to a traffic jam. The matter had been fixed thereafter on 17th August, 2001. Though the advocate for the petitioners appeared in Court no steps were taken to file an application for setting aside the exparte order. An application was filed only on 11th September, 2001. That application was also dismissed. The respondents moved an application for amendment. which was granted. The petitio
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.