The main legal point established in the judgment is that if the State fails to pay the compensation within a substantial delay, not due to the affected party, the affected party would be entitled to compensation at a specified rate from the date of the award till the amount is paid.

F.I. Rebello, J.-Rule.

Respondents waive service. Heard forthwith.

2. Land belonging to the petitioners was acquired. An award came to be passed on 22nd January, 1997. Notice under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued to the petitioners to accept the compensation awarded, on 3rd February, 2000. The date for payment was fixed on 22nd February, 2000.

3. A few relevant dates may be set out before framing the issue which has to be considered. Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published in the Official Gazette on 17th March, 1993 for the public purpose as set out therein. Amongst the lands notified was land belonging to the petitioners surveyed under No. 138/1 (Part). A declaration under Section 6 came to be published on 20th April, 1994 in the Official Gazette dated 21st April, 1994. Notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act thereafter came to be served in the name of late Shrinivas Vaidya, the father of the petitioners who had expired in the year 1978. The case of the petitioners is that. at the time the notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act was issued by the Land Acquisition Officer, Inventory Proceedings were pending, which were finally concluded by Order dated 22nd April, 1996. On 25th July, 1997, the petitioner No.1 informed the Land Acquisition Officer the above facts and requested that amount of compensation be apportioned among petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and one Rajesh Vaidya in equal shares of 1/3rd each, based on the share allotted to each of them in the Inventory Proceedings. The Award was made on 21st January, 1997. The Land Acquisition Officer apportioned the amount of compensation in favour of petitioner No. 1, petitioner No. 2 and Rajesh Vaidya in equal shares of 1/3rd each. The petitioners were not present personally when the Award was made on 22nd January, 1997.

4. On behalf of the petitioners, it is contended that the Award having been made on 22nd January, 1997 and as the compensation was paid to them w.e.f. only 22nd February, 2000, they are entitled for interest on the said amount of compensation from 23rd January, 1997 till 21st February, 2000. This is the principal issue in this petition.

5. Respondent No. 2 has filed a reply on behalf of the respondents. It is pointed out that the petitioners as also Shri Shrinivas Vaidya filed their representation dated 15th March. 2000 demanding additional statutory interest from 22nd January, 1997 to 22nd February, 2000. A reply was given to the said letter by the Land Acquisition Officer dated 6th June, 2000, wherein the petitioners and Shri Shrinivas Vaidya were informed that 12% interest was payable from the date of publication of notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act to the date of the Award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier and in the instant case, the interest was paid till the date of the Award as it was earlier to the date of taking possession of the land which was 22nd February, 2000. It is, therefore, pointed out that considering Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the petitioners are not entitled for interest from the date of the Award till the date of payment i.e. 22nd February, 2000.

6. At the hearing of the petition on behalf of the petitioners, their learned counsel contends that if the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is considered, it would be clear that compensation has to be paid when the award is made. In the instant case the date of the Award is 22nd January. 1997 and the date on which the compensation was paid is 22nd February, 2000. In these circumstances it is pointed out that bearing in mind the provisions for payment of interest petitioners are entitled to the same. Reliance is placed on various judgments which would be adverted to in the course of the discussion.

7. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent No.1, learned Advocate General contends that looking at the language of Section 34 of the Act, it would be clear that no inte